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Abstract 
This study investigates whether country risk factors, including political and fiscal budget risk, 
attenuate the effectiveness of tax policy tools that aim to encourage corporate risk-taking. 
Exploiting a cross-country panel, we predict and find that the effectiveness of loss offset rules and 
tax rate changes is fully attenuated for firms located in high-risk countries. We document the 
attenuating effect of country risk is more pronounced in high-tax countries or when countries 
increase their corporate tax rate. Additional tests around the U.S. federal budget crises from 2011 
to 2013 indicate that temporarily heightened fiscal budget risk attenuates the effectiveness of loss 
offset rules even in countries with low political risk. We identify conditions (low political and low 
fiscal budget risk) under which targeted tax policy tools effectively stimulate risk-taking. This 
suggests that ensuring taxpayers receive tax refunds is important in times of economic crises with 
budgetary or political challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates whether country-specific risk factors mitigate the effectiveness of 
tax policy designed to encourage corporate risk-taking. Political actions often target corporate 
risk-taking because it is associated with economic growth. Recent policy reports indicate that tax 
policy is an effective tool to foster investments by creating an attractive tax environment (IMF 
2017) and as response to the COVID-19 pandemic (IMF 2020). However, corporate risk-taking, 
reportedl\ ³depend[s] on countr\-specific circumstances [and] policy and institutional risk 
factors´ (IMF 2017). We define country risk as taxpa\ers¶ risk that the\ will not receive tax 
refunds on losses because of institutional environment, including governance and administration 
of tax policy or fiscal reasons.1 Specifically, this study investigates whether and to what extent 
country risk affects the ability of direct tax policy tools (tax rate and loss offset changes) to 
encourage corporate risk-taking.  
Corporate tax rate changes and comprehensive loss offset rules are direct policy tools 
because they provide cash flows for initial losses and decrease the cost of investing in risky 
projects. Policymakers can use these tools easily and therefore are prone to use them as direct 
investment measures (Graham and Kim 2009; IMF 2017). By contrast, alternative instruments 
that indirectly encourage corporate risk-taking by creating a favorable investment climate, such 
as governance institutions, are difficult to adjust in the short-term and relatively stable over time 
(John, Litov, and Yeung 2008; Dharmapala and Hines 2009). Prior literature documents the 
effectiveness of tax rate changes and loss offset rules and emphasizes the stimulating potential of 
loss carrybacks but does not account for country-specific risk factors (Ljungqvist, Zhang, and 
 
1 Our definition of fiscal budget risk captures financial constraints of governments arising from interest payments 
and repayments of principal. Hence, it is a broader construct that differs from more specific risks such as sovereign 
risk that limits fiscal policy (e.g. Bianchi, Ottonello, and Presno 2019) or inflation that relates to monetary policy. 
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Zou 2017; Langenmayr and Lester 2018).2 While these policy tools are prominent examples of 
cash-effective policy tools, their effectiveness to trigger economic growth depends on the 
countr\¶s institutional environment and fiscal constraints.  
We distinguish between political and fiscal budget risk as elements of country risk and 
investigate whether they counteract the tax incentive from tax rate changes and loss offset 
provisions. Scaled by the tax rate, they determine the amount of tax refunds and whether tax 
refunds are viable. Tax policy will affect firms¶ behavior only if firms can reasonably expect to 
receive timely tax refunds. We define political risk to capture overall country governance as it 
manifests in government effectiveness affecting tax collections and refunds on losses. Countries 
with low political risk implement and administer tax policy efficiently and pay tax refunds 
reliably (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011; Vegh and Vuletin 2015). These countries 
credibly commit not to expropriate companies through unfavorable regulations and to provide 
timely refunds. Countries with high political risk do not. For example, Donnelley (2017) 
describes how political risk by the tax authority in South Africa systematically delayed tax 
refunds to taxpayers, causing companies to hoard funds otherwise available for investments and 
question the timing and amount of any future refunds (Khumalo 2017; PwC and WBG 2018). 
We also consider fiscal budget risk. Fiscal budget risk arises when governments face 
liquidity constraints, arising from a variety of sources regardless of political risk. Anecdotal 
evidence corroborates our argument that fiscal budget risk occurs in countries with both 
relatively low and high levels of political risk (IMF 2016; Daily Times 2018; Parlapiano and 
Yourish 2018). For example, low credit ratings in Pakistan or Ukraine (high political risk), or 
government shutdowns in the United States (low political risk) affect government liquidity. 
 
2 Specifically, we examine the association between country-specific risk factors and risk-taking for firms domiciled 
in the respective country. See Section 3 for details. 
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Two streams of research motivate our paper. First, Domar and Musgrave (1944) 
demonstrate that risk-averse investors increase risk-taking when governments share corporate 
risks through comprehensive loss offset provisions and the underlying tax rate (Domar-Musgrave 
effect). Recent empirical studies provide evidence that firms share risk with the government 
through the corporate tax system and that corporate loss offset provisions, especially loss 
carrybacks, matter (Ljungqvist et al. 2017; Langenmayr and Lester 2018). However, these 
studies only find a negative association between tax rate increases and risk-taking with no 
corresponding effects for tax rate cuts. This asymmetry in risk-taking responses to tax rate 
changes is inconsistent with Domar and Musgrave¶s theor\. One potential explanation for this 
inconsistency is that country-level risk factors affect the critical tax rate. Therefore, we consider 
the underlying Domar-Musgrave mechanism in its full complexity including the interaction of 
tax rate level, tax rate changes and loss offset provisions.3  
The second stream of literature motivating our paper documents that country risk factors 
affect the overall level of corporate investment, financing and capital structure decisions, as well 
as risk-taking (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2008; John et al. 2008; Dharmapala and Hines 2009). 
Relatedly, Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun (2019) document a negative association 
between political risk and firms¶ investment using a firm-level measure of political risk. This 
stream of literature suggests that countries with reliable institutions and governance show strong 
 
3 Prior literature investigates the interaction of broader country risk and taxes not in a Domar-Musgrave setting. For 
example, Hail, Sikes, and Wang (2017) investigate the effect of capital gains taxes and government institutions on 
indiYidXals¶ expected market returns absent of loss offset restrictions. By contrast, we examine corporate risk-taking 
under profit taxes with loss offset restrictions.  
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correlations between taxes and investment indicating that tax policy is likely to be used as a 
promising investment policy measure. 4 
We extend the Domar-Musgrave model by integrating the attenuating effect of country 
risk on risk-taking in response to tax policy changes. Our model yields three predictions. First, 
country risk factors reduce the effectiveness of loss offset provisions to induce corporate risk-
taking. Second, in the presence of country risk, it is more likely that a tax rate increase 
discourages risk-taking than in the absence of country risk. Third, the observed effect of country 
risk increases in the underlying corporate tax rate, which amplifies the impact of country risk.  
We empirically test our predictions using a cross-country panel. In our primary analysis, 
we exploit 52 increases and 183 decreases in corporate tax rates and 49 changes in loss offset 
provisions affecting 25,906 firms domiciled in 64 countries from 1992 to 2012. Consistent with 
prior literature (John et al. 2008; Langenmayr and Lester 2018), we use the standard deviation of 
a firm¶s country-industry demeaned return on assets (ROA) to measure risk-taking. This 
approach removes the potential effects of macroeconomic cycles and isolates firm-specific risk-
taking responses to changes in tax rates and loss offsets.  
We first provide evidence for the first prediction of our model that high political risk 
attenuates the association between changes in loss offset rules and corporate risk-taking. To put 
our findings in perspective: the adoption of a loss carryback regime in countries with political 
risk below the median (e.g., Spain) is associated with a 13.8 percent increase in corporate risk-
taking. A carryback rule adoption in countries above the median (e.g., Mexico) does not 
 
4 Political and fiscal budget risk may by partially due to country-specific economic risk. Beyond the extent country-
specific economic risk translates into political and fiscal budget risk, we abstract from economic risk as a separate 
country risk-factor. However, as country-specific economic risk is either captured by political or fiscal budget risk 
or the expected cash flows of the underlying firm, we account for economic risk via these two channels implicitly 
both in our theoretical and our empirical model. We address this concern in our robustness tests in Section 6. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3297418
 - 5 - 
significantly increase risk-taking. Similarly, we find that high fiscal budget risk fully attenuates 
the association between changes in loss offset rules and corporate risk-taking suggesting loss 
carrybacks are ineffective to foster corporate risk-taking in high-risk countries. 
Second, our theoretical model predicts that tax rate increases discourage risk-taking in 
environments with high country risk. Our empirical results confirm this prediction for political 
and fiscal budget risk yet indicate a more pronounced negative impact of fiscal budget risk. 
Lastly, we test our third prediction that tax rates scale the effect of country risk. Consistent with 
our predictions, we find a more pronounced negative effect of country risk in countries with high 
corporate tax rates compared to countries with low tax rates. Consequently, high (low) country 
risk also reduces (increases) the critical tax rate described in the Domar-Musgrave model making 
tax policies in high-tax countries particularly vulnerable to country risk. In additional country-
level analyses, we document an attenuating effect of country risk on aggregate risky investments 
such as research and development (R&D) expenditures and patent applications. 
To mitigate concerns that our results reflect general effects of country risk rather than the 
attenuating effect of country risk on the effectiveness of tax policy, we exploit a narrower setting 
in a second set of analyses. This setting mitigates endogeneity concerns as it includes firms 
located in comparable countries in which one country experienced a temporary increase in fiscal 
budget risk. Specifically, we examine the time around the debt ceiling, fiscal cliff, and 
government shutdown in the United States (from 2011 to 2013). In this period, the federal 
government suffered a sequence of budget crises that potentially attenuated the effectiveness of 
tax policy measures (Hassan et al. 2019). We exploit this setting in a repeated difference-in-
differences design that compares risk-taking of U.S. firms to Canadian firms with similar 
economic conditions and loss offset rules (first difference) around each event of the budget crises 
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from 2011 to 2013 (second difference).5 We provide evidence that U.S. firms with access to loss 
carrybacks exhibit a lower level of risk-taking compared to control firms only during the time of 
the U.S. budget crises. This finding indicates that fiscal budget risk, even in economically well-
performing countries with only a moderate level of political risk, is an important attenuating 
factor for the effectiveness of tax policy tools. A battery of robustness tests that examine the 
sensitivity of our results supports our findings.6  
Our study contributes to three streams of literature. First, we contribute to the literature 
on the effect of tax policy on corporate risk-taking and investment (e.g., Ljungqvist et al. 2017; 
Bethmann, Jacob, and Müller 2018; Langenmayr and Lester 2018). We provide theoretical and 
empirical evidence that the effectiveness of tax policy on corporate risk-taking and investment 
varies with the level of country risk. Our findings inform policymakers¶ decisions on direct (tax 
policy) and indirect (institutional) measures to foster risky investment. Second and more 
specifically, we add to the literature on the Domar-Musgrave effect by providing evidence that 
country risk affects the critical tax rate which ultimately determines outcomes of tax policy.  
Lastly, we add to research on the design of corporate tax systems to incentivize corporate 
investment and risk-taking (Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer 2010; Vegh and 
Vuletin 2015). We respond to the call of Mills (2019) for more analyses of tax reforms building 
on institutional knowledge, theories and methods. Specifically, we are the first to document that 
the effectiveness of tax policy to foster investment and risk-taking crucially depends on fiscal 
budget risk. This result extends prior literature that only considers political risk (Dharmapala and 
 
5 The difference-in-differences design also mitigates concerns that time-series variation in country risk is limited and 
hence it is difficult to separate first-order effects of country-level risk from tax policy measures. Our setting focuses 
on a significant increase in fiscal budget risk enhancing our identification strategy and internal validity of the 
documented effect. 
6 See Section 6 for details. 
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Hines 2009; Hail, et al. 2017). Our study sheds light on conditions under which targeted tax 
policy tools are effective.7 Importantly, we document the effectiveness of the underlying tax 
policy tools is sensitive to temporarily heightened fiscal budget risk, even in countries that are 
characterized by reliable institutions and governance like the U.S. This has important policy 
implications for current discussions about the effectiveness of government stimuli around the 
world (e.g., immediate loss carrybacks). Our findings indicate that ensuring taxpayers receive tax 
refunds is important in times of economic crises with budgetary or political challenges. 
2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Theoretical Model  
The seminal paper by Domar and Musgrave (1944) lays the theoretical foundation that 
explains the effect of taxation on investors¶ risk-taking. They model an investor who ³weigh[s] 
the advantage of a greater return, or yield, against the disadvantage of a possible loss, or risk´ 
(Domar and Musgrave 1944, 388). Generally, taxes reduce yields and discourage investments of 
a risk-averse investor. However, the authors demonstrate under a complete loss offset that the 
government¶s ³share-in´ can increase risk-taking of investors. If risk-averse investors maximize 
their expected utility, they attribute a higher weight to the increase in utility from an expected tax 
refund on losses than disutility to the expected tax burden on profits. The size of this effect is 
driven by three factors: the tax rate (the higher the tax rate the more pronounced is this sharing 
effect), the degree of risk aversion, and the extent of loss offset provisions. However, absent or 
 
7 Prior literature defines country risk as a broad concept. For example, Hail et al. 2017 describe political risk as trust 
in government institutions captured b\ ³no corruption´ and ³tax morale´. B\ contrast, we focus on countr\-level 
conditions that are crucial for companies to trust a reliable tax benefit. We decompose country-level risk into 
political and fiscal risk. Furthermore, we exploit the cross-country variation in loss offset restrictions across 
countries and over time to study their effectiveness to encourage risky corporate investments under different levels 
of country risk. 
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limited loss offset possibilities cause the investor to reduce risk-taking once taxes are imposed. 
The overall effect is either positive or negative due to these two opposing effects. 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Domar and Musgrave findings indicate that risk-taking ሺ𝜎ሻ 
increases in the extent of loss offset ሺ𝜆ሻ for a given tax rate ሺ𝑡ሻ. Here, loss offset restrictions are 
described by a level of loss offset 𝜆 below 1 which captures all features of codified loss offset 
restrictions such as loss carry backwards, loss carry forwards and limitations in the maximum 
amount of loss offset or time limits in carryback or carryforward periods.8 However, under a 
limited loss offset rule it is more likely that this increase in risk-taking reverses for a high tax 
rate. If the tax rate exceeds a critical threshold then the investors will decrease risk-taking for a 
given level of loss offset. 
To illustrate the forces at work both without and with country risk we develop the model 
stepwise. In the first step, we abstract from country risk. Consistent with prior literature (Domar 
and Musgrave 1944; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; Langenmayr and Lester 2018), we assume a 
firm that aims to invest a fixed amount I chooses the level of risk 𝜎 involved. Domar and 
Musgrave assume risk-averse individual investors, while the empirical studies focus on 
corporations. Consistent with empirical evidence showing corporations exhibit risk-averse 
characteristics in their investment profile (Hunter and Smith 2002; Purnanandam 2008) we 
assume a risk-averse corporate decision-maker.9 With probability 𝑝 the invested amount 𝐼 
generates a profit given by the function 𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ with 𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ ൐ 0 (good state of nature), with 
 
8 Empirical research provides evidence that half of the accumulated tax value of loss carryforwards erodes because 
of loss offset restrictions and insufficient profits in the future (Cooper and Knittel 2006; Edgerton 2010).  
9 Moreover, managers derive their utility from the firm's returns as manager compensation is typically linked to firm 
performance (Guay 1999; Hall and Murphy 2002; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006; Lewellen 2006) and therefore 
are risk-averse in their corporate decisions. 
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probability ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ a loss of 𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0 is incurred (bad state of nature). We assume a net-of-
taxes utility function of the risk-averse decision-maker 𝑈ൣሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ൫𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼൯൧ ൌ 𝑈ൣ𝑓௚൧ െ 𝐵  and  
𝑈ሾሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻሺ𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼ሻሿ ൌ 𝑈ሾ𝑓௕ሿ ൅ 𝐴, where 𝐵 denotes the decrease in utility due to the tax 
payment on the profit in the good state of nature and 𝐴 the increase in utility due to the tax 
refund from loss offset in the bad state of nature. Due to risk-aversion, the utility gain from a full 
tax refund is larger than a corresponding expected utility loss from taxes on profits (𝐴 ൐ 𝐵).  
We assume for the post-tax profit in the good and the after-tax loss in the bad state of 
nature 𝜋௚ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ ∙ ൫𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼൯ ൐ 0  and  𝜋௕ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝜆𝑡ሻ ∙ ሺ𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼ሻ ൏ 0, where 𝜆 ൌ 1 
indicates a full loss offset while 𝜆 ൏ 1 describes loss offset restrictions and 𝜆 ൌ 0 the absence of 
loss offset provisions. More generous loss offset rules increase the optimal level of risk-taking 
(Domar and Musgrave 1944; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) due to increased risk sharing with the 
government. The expected tax refund on losses adds more to the risk-averse decision-maker¶s 
expected utility than a corresponding expected tax burden on profits decreases utility (Figure 2).  
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
The direction of the overall tax effect switches for tax rates higher than the critical tax rate. For 
more details on the underlying opposing effects see Appendix A. To show this mechanism 
formally we determine the partial derivative of the expected risk-utility function 𝐸ሾ𝑈ሿ with 
respect to 𝜎 and finally obtain the first order condition (𝐹𝑂𝐶) ങಶሾೆሿ
ങ഑
ൌ 0 with respect to the level 
of loss offset 𝜆 finally (see Appendix B) 
ௗ𝜎
ௗ𝜆
ൌ
ሺ1−𝑝ሻ∙𝑡∙𝑓ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ∙ൣ𝑈ᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ+𝑈
ᇲᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ∙𝜋್൧
𝑆𝑂𝐶
൐ 0, (1) 
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with the second order condition, 𝑆𝑂𝐶 ൏ 0 (see proof in Appendix B). Greater loss offset 𝜆 
unambiguously increases risk-taking 𝜎. The tax rate 𝑡 scales both the size of the tax refund and 
the risk-taking effect (numerator).10 
By contrast, the overall effect of the tax rate on corporate risk-taking is ambiguous. While 
higher tax rates often induce increased risk-taking, tax rates that exceed a critical threshold lead 
to a reversed effect.11 This ambiguity is obvious in Figure 1 and can be formally described by 
ௗ𝜎
ௗ𝑡
ൌ
𝑝∙𝑈ᇲᇲൣ𝜋೒൧∙𝜋೒∙𝑓೒ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ+𝑝∙𝑈ᇲൣ𝜋೒൧∙𝑓೒ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ
+ሺ1−𝑝ሻ∙𝑈ᇲᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ∙𝜆∙𝜋್∙𝑓
ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ+ሺ1−𝑝ሻ∙𝑈ᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ∙𝜆∙𝑓
ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ
𝑆𝑂𝐶
⋛ 0. (2) 
First, increasing the tax rate reduces the return from additional risk-taking in the good state of 
nature but simultaneously increases the marginal utility of the additional profit. Second, under 
full loss offset a higher tax rate increases risk-taking while under no loss offset the tax rate 
decreases risk-taking. Both effects are visible in the numerator. As after-tax losses (𝜋௕) also 
determine the marginal utility, the effect from risk aversion is a function of the tax rate. 
Therefore, this effect decreases in the tax rate (see Figure 2, Appendix A, and Appendix C).12  
In the spirit of Domar-Musgrave, recent empirical studies on corporate risk-taking 
assume a permanent and unobstructed risk-sharing between government and firm.13 They do not 
capture all types of risk involved in a risky investment. These studies either account for 
operational risk or political risk, but not both. In addition, they do not account for the interactive 
 
10 In empirical tests of H1, we account for the scaling effect of tax rates by including an interaction term of loss 
offset and tax rates. We investigate the scaling effect of tax rates in H2 and H3 (see Section 4 for details). 
11 A higher tax rate mitigates the intensity of this effect as a higher tax rate and the resulting larger tax refund leads 
to higher utility levels and lower marginal utility in the bad state. Moreover, the tax rate directly affects corporate 
risk-taking. However, the direction of this effect is ambiguous (Figure 1). 
12 See Propositions 1 and 2 in Langenmayr and Lester (2018). 
13 Langenmayr and Lester (2018) and Ljungqvist et al. (2017) their empirical analyses provide evidence that both 
loss offset rules and tax rates affect corporate risk-taking and that the benefits from loss offsets increase in the tax 
rate. The studies use a cross-country sample of Western European countries and the U.S. and staggered changes in 
corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, respectively. 
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effects of country risk factors and changes in tax rates and loss offset rules. However, the finance 
literature (Desai et al. 2008; John et al. 2008) provides strong evidence that several firm 
decisions, such as capital structure decisions, are directly or indirectly influenced by political risk 
(De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen 2008; Kesternich and Schnitzer 2010).14 Also Hail et al. (2017) 
support this view for individual investors. They find that the negative association of capital gains 
taxes (absent of loss offset restrictions) and individuals¶ expected market returns is particularly 
strong in countries with more trust in government institutions.  
We examine and define country risk as country-specific uncertainty triggered by two 
sources. Political risk and fiscal budget risk associated with the country-specific ability to collect 
and refund taxes (Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta 1996; Kesternich and Schnitzer 2010; Kaufmann et 
al. 2011; Damodaran 2017).15 Theoretical arguments and prior literature suggest these two 
sources of country risk affect the ability of tax rate changes and loss offset changes to encourage 
corporate risk-taking. Prior literature identifies three main factors of political risk: differences in 
institutional development (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998), legal 
protection of investors (Henisz 2000; John et al. 2008), and threat of opportunistic expropriation 
through changes in taxation, regulation, or other financial constraints (Kaufmann et al. 2011; 
Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2016). All three factors impact the propensity of a government to 
refund taxes on losses. Political risk is associated with reduced risk-taking, investment, and 
employment for firms within a country (Desai et al. 2008; John et al. 2008; Dharmapala and 
Hines 2009; Hassan et al. 2019). While political risk can result in the non-payment of taxes 
 
14 We document that country risk factors provide one explanation for the inconsistent findings of prior literature 
within the Domar-Musgrave framework. However, further or alternative potential explanations build on the findings 
in prospect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and salience theoretical analyses (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 
2012), which should be scrutinized empirically in future research. 
15 Please refer to Section 3 for details on the proxies used for country risk. 
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through lax enforcement by the tax administration and arbitrary enforcement of tax payments, it 
can also be an obstacle to tax refunds. 
Fiscal budget risk stems from financial constraints of a countr\¶s government. One 
source of financial constraints arises from interest payments and repayment of principle in the 
future (Hamilton and Flavin 1986). The resulting fiscal budget constraints further limit the ability 
of a government to provide refunds for firms¶ loss offsets. This is particularly pronounced if 
many firms in an economic downturn make use of loss carrybacks because the government faces 
lower current revenues and is obligated to provide cash tax refunds (Alfonso, Gomes, and Rother 
2011; Vegh and Vuletin 2015). While firms prefer carrybacks over carryforwards because of the 
immediate cash inflow effect, governments suffer from this immediate negative cash flow effect. 
Tax refunds amplify the negative budgetary effects for governments that arise from 
macroeconomic crises (Dwenger 2008; Dobridge 2016). 
In the first step of our theoretical model, we implicitly assume that the overall risk 
exposure in the model is driven by all kinds and sources of risk, including country risk. 
However, to improve the empirical specification it is worthwhile to integrate country risk 
explicitly into the model in the second step. If the investment¶s risk exposure is affected b\ 
country risk, this translates in theoretical terms into a decrease in the effective loss offset 
potential. In the following 𝜆መ ൌ 𝜃𝜆 captures the loss offset potential under country risk, where 𝜃 
is the country risk coefficient. 𝜃 ൌ 1 describes the absence of country risk while 0 ൑ 𝜃 ൏
1 indicates that the country of investment is characterized by political or fiscal budget risk that 
jeopardize tax refunds. Thus, we implicitly assume that the country risk multiplier 𝜃 is an 
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attenuator of the effectiveness of the loss offset provision.16 From 𝜆መ ൌ 𝜃𝜆 and ௗ𝜎
ௗ𝜆
൐ 0 (eq. (1)) 
we obtain for the effect of loss offset restrictions ሺ𝜆ሻ and country risk (𝜃 ൏ 1ሻ on optimal risk-
taking ሺ𝜎ොሻ 
ௗ𝜎ෝ
ௗ𝜆෡
ൌ
ሺ1−𝑝ሻ∙𝑡∙𝑓ᇲሺ𝜎ෝሻ∙ൣ𝑈ᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ+𝑈
ᇲᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ∙𝜋್൧
𝑆𝑂𝐶෣
൏
ሺ1−𝑝ሻ∙𝑡∙𝑓ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ∙ൣ𝑈ᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ+𝑈
ᇲᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ∙𝜋್൧
𝑆𝑂𝐶
ൌ
ௗ𝜎
ௗ𝜆
 (3) 
with ௗ𝜎ෝ
ௗ𝜆෡
൐ 0, 𝑆𝑂𝐶෢ ൏ 0 and 𝑆𝑂𝐶෢ ൏  𝑆𝑂𝐶. As country risk only changes the level of effective loss 
offset (𝜆መ ൏ 𝜆ሻ if 𝜃 ൏ 1 the direction of the effect, again, is uniform and positive. Lower effective 
loss offset, i.e., lower expected tax refunds due to country risk, reduce risk-taking as loss offset 
restrictions do in general. Focusing on the effect of country risk (𝜃 ൏ 1), we find  
ௗ𝜎ෝ
ௗ𝜃
ൌ
ሺ1−𝑝ሻ∙𝜆∙𝑡∙𝑓ᇲሺ𝜎ෝሻ∙ൣ𝑈ᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ+𝑈
ᇲᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ∙𝜋್൧
𝑆𝑂𝐶෣
൐ 0. (4) 
An increase in country risk, i.e., a decrease in 𝜃, uniformly reduces risk-taking. Furthermore, we 
can easily see that ௗ𝜎ෝ
ௗ𝜃
 increases in the tax rate 𝑡.  
In summary, in this model country risk generates three effects on risk-taking (eq. (3) and 
(4)). Firstly, the impact of loss offset provisions in the face of country risk is lower than in the 
absence of country risk-induced limits to tax refunds (eq. (3); illustrated in Figure 3 as effect 1). 
Secondly, country risk reduces the effectiveness of the tax incentive from loss offset provisions 
making it more likely that a tax rate increase discourages risk-taking (eq. (4), Figure 3, effect 2). 
Thirdly, this impact of country risk on risk-taking is scaled by the tax rate (eq. (4); Figure 3, 
effect 3). 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
16 This approach to model country risk allows a whole array of interpretations, such as country-specific risk arising 
from rejected or missing tax refunds due to administrative inefficiency, budgetary illiquidity, tax base disputes that 
culminate into a reduced deductible tax loss etc. 
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Figure 3 exemplifies all three effects for a common risk-averse attitude, i.e., for a logarithmic 
risk utility function (constant relative risk aversion). We find a critical tax rate (circle) that 
exactly neutralizes the risk sharing mechanism. As a consequence of country risk (dashed lines), 
this critical tax rate is much lower than in the absence of country risk (solid lines). 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
Motivated by the mixed empirical evidence on tax policy and corporate risk-taking and 
these theoretical mechanisms, we predict that increased country risk attenuates the positive 
association between loss offset provisions and firm risk-taking. We predict that increased 
country risk shifts the portion of the risk shared between the firm and the government towards 
the firm for those firms that are located in a country with high country risk. Hence, firms 
exposed to high country risk bear additional risk relative to comparable firms exposed to low 
country risk. Consequently, a similar change in tax rates and/or loss offset rules under high 
country risk leads to a smaller change in corporate risk-taking or even a reverse effect. These 
theoretically deducted mechanisms suggest that the findings of prior literature are not 
generalizable to countries with high levels of country risk. Based on this rationale, we develop 
three testable hypotheses.  
First, governments of countries with higher country risk are more inclined to tax 
companies¶ profits but are reluctant to share in losses, leading to a negative effect on corporate 
risk-taking (Dharmapala and Hines 2009). This effect is more pronounced if tax rates are high. 
Figure 3 illustrates this as effect 1. Specifically, the figure illustrates that for each and every 
combination of tax rate (t) and level of loss offset provision (O) country risk decreases the 
optimal level of risk-taking. This country risk effect (effect 1 in Figure 3) is reflected in a 
downward shift of all dashed lines (in comparison to the respective solid lines in the same color). 
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We expect that country risk is a complex construct capturing factors that are particularly crucial 
for tax refunds on losses. To identify those country risk factors that are important attenuators of 
tax policy measures, we decompose country risk into political and fiscal budget risk. Based on 
this rationale, we conjecture the following: 
H1a:   Political risk of a country attenuates the positive association between loss offset 
provisions and corporate risk-taking. 
Correspondingly, we investigate the effect of fiscal budget risk on risk-taking. As 
anecdotal evidence and prior research indicate, governments can mitigate budget constraints by 
stretching the duration to provide cash tax refunds to taxpayers (Dwenger 2008; Dobridge 2016). 
This negatively affects corporate risk-taking because firms face losses and only delayed (cash) 
refunds for carrybacks or decreased expectations of future tax refunds on carryforwards. Recent 
research provides evidence that governments actively use tax policy tools to balance public 
spending in economic downturns and upturns (Goncharov and Jacob 2014, Vegh and Vuletin 
2015, Costello, Petacchi, and Weber 2017). Therefore, we predict the following: 
H1b:  Fiscal budget risk of a country attenuates the positive association between loss offset 
provisions and corporate risk-taking. 
Second, we demonstrate in equation (4) of the model that for a given corporate tax rate 
increase, country risk attenuates the positive association between loss offset provisions and 
corporate risk-taking. As illustrated in Figure 3 (effect 2), country risk shifts the critical tax rate 
to the left, making it more likely that a tax rate increase affects risk-taking negatively. Hence, we 
predict the following: 
H2:  A tax rate increase is more likely to discourage risk-taking if country risk is high. 
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Third, we demonstrate in our theoretical model (eq. (4)) that the moderating effect of 
country risk on the tax loss offset provision increases in the underlying corporate tax rate. This 
relation is also illustrated as effect 3 in Figure 3. The distance between the solid and dashed lines 
increases in the tax rate leading to a more pronounced effect of country risk for high tax rates 
compared to low tax rates. Therefore, in our third hypothesis, we conjecture:  
H3:  The negative impact of country risk on corporate risk-Waking increases in Whe coXnWr\¶s 
tax rate. 
There are at least two possible explanations why we might not find the hypothesized 
relation between country risk and corporate risk-taking. First, firms might not be sensitive to 
targeted tax policy measures as non-tax related factors (e.g., nature of investment or underlying 
business model) dominate their investment decisions. In contrast to a capital market setting (Hail 
et al. 2017), corporate investments include a variety of very different and partially less 
responsive assets. Capital market investments are characterized by high trade volumes and quick 
responses to new developments, making them more sensitive to country risk. Second, country 
risk could have a broader scope than we define.17 This might be crucial for attenuating corporate 
risk-taking.  
3. Empirical Analyses 
3.1 Cross-country Panel and Empirical Identification Strategy 
We use a sample of firms domiciled in 64 countries over the period 1992 to 2012 to test 
our hypotheses. A cross-country study allows us to investigate the effectiveness of loss offset 
rules dependent on the country¶s characteristics as it offers a setting with greater variation in tax 
 
17 General country risk could imply country-specific political risk (e.g., corruption and low tax morale, Hail et al. 
2017) or firm-level political risk (e.g., portion of conference calls devoted to political risks topics, Hassan et al. 
2019).  
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rate changes, loss offset rules, political, and fiscal budget risk across countries (Djankov et al. 
2010; Vegh and Vuletin 2015). We select 1992 as a starting point because Eastern European and 
other emerging markets started their transition to the market system and capital market 
liberalizations around this year (Bekaert and Harvey 2002). Importantly, our sample comprises a 
substantial portion of the world including developed and developing countries.18 Figure 4 
provides an overview of our sample countries. 
<Insert Figure 4 about here> 
While many country risk factors are relatively time-invariant or changing slowly, several 
shocks in our sample period allow us to exploit changes in political, and fiscal budget risk as 
well as tax policy changes.19 The sample period includes several economic shocks, such as the 
Asian crisis in 1997/98, the dot-com bubble in 2000/2001, and the financial crisis in 2008. Our 
sample ends in 2012 because we require data for two subsequent years (2013 and 2014) to 
calculate the three-year risk measures. 
We exploit changes in corporate tax rates and loss offset rules. Our sample consists of 
1,058 country-year observations that include 52 increases and 183 decreases in corporate tax 
rates in 29 and 50 countries, respectively. The mean tax rate increase is 2.4 percentage points and 
the mean tax rate decrease is 3.3 percentage points. Our sample includes 36 changes in loss 
carryforward rules and 13 changes in carryback rules. This comprises 32 (four) increases 
(decreases) in the length of LCF rules. Our sample includes 8 (5) enactments (abolishments) of 
loss carryback rules. 
 
18 We cover 33 OECD countries and countries developing rapidly during our sample period. However, we face 
limited data availability for some regions and are not able to include many African and Middle Eastern countries.  
19 Consistent with prior literature (Langenmayr and Lester 2018), we use consolidated financial data of firms. This 
includes firms that operate mainly domestically but also multinational firms that are exposed to tax and country risk 
environments of several jurisdictions. We document a stronger association for domestic firms (see Table A.1). 
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3.2 Effect of Country Risk on Corporate Risk-Taking 
We follow Langenmayr and Lester (2018) and investigate the effect of tax rate changes 
and loss offset rules on corporate risk-taking of firms domiciled in their headquarter country. We 
modify this specification and explicitly account for the interactive effect of country risk factors 
and changes in corporate tax rates and loss offset rules on corporate risk-taking: 
Firm Risk-Taking I,t =  Į0 + ȕ1 LCj,t + ȕ2 CTRStdj,t + ȕ3  LC*CTRStdj,t + ȕ4  CountryRiskFactorj,t  
+ ȕ5 LC*CountryRiskFactorj,t + ȕ6  CTRStdj,t*CountryRiskFactorj,t  
+ ȕ7 LC*CTRStdj,t*CountryRiskFactor + ȕn Ci,j,t + Įk,t + İi,j,t  (5) 
The dependent variable Firm Risk-Takingi,t is a measure of the riskiness of firm 
investment. We define Firm Risk-Takingi,t for firm i as the standard deviation over three years 
(𝑡 , 𝑡 ൅ 1, 𝑡 ൅ 2) of a firm¶s ROA¶s (EBIT/Total Assets) deviation from the country-industry-
specific average ROA for the respective year (John et al. 2008, Langenmayr and Lester 2018). 
Importantl\, this measure proxies for firms¶ operating risk and removes the influence of home 
country and industry-specific economic cycles. Firm management cannot alter this cycle, and 
thus our measure directly reflects the riskiness of corporate investment.20 
Our main independent variables capture tax system determinants of a firm¶s home 
country.21 Our main variable of interest, LCj,t, captures the length of the statutory loss carryback 
period and the codified option of a loss carryforward in firm i¶s home country j in year t.22 We 
use the length of the loss carryforward period in years. For unlimited loss carryforward periods, 
we use 20 years (maximum for limited loss carryforward).23 For loss carrybacks, we use an 
 
20 To accommodate for potentially differing planning horizons, we also re-estimate all regressions with a 5-year 
industry-adjusted measure of Firm Risk-Taking. Results remain substantially unchanged. 
21 We collect the country-level tax data from Coopers & Lybrand International Tax Summaries, Ernst & Young 
(EY) and PwC tax yearbooks. 
22 We define home country as the jurisdiction in which the country is headquartered. 
23 We also use 100 years to account for unlimited loss carryforwards and find comparable effects. 
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indicator variable that equals one if the country offers a loss carryback and zero if the country 
does not (Bethmann et al. 2018). 
The coefficient ȕ1 captures the effect of the loss rules on risk-taking, given the average 
corporate tax rate in the sample. We expect a positive effect of loss carryforwards and carrybacks 
on corporate risk-taking (ȕ1 > 0) (Langenmayr and Lester 2018). Although of similar sign, we 
predict a stronger effect if a loss carryback is in place (Bethmann et al. 2018; Langenmayr and 
Lester 2018). Second, CTRStdj,t captures the standardized corporate tax rate of country j in year 
t.24 We use the top corporate tax rate bracket of the country standardize tax rate CTRStdj,t across 
the sample and expect a negative coefficient (ȕ2 < 0). Third, LC*CTRStdj,t. captures the 
interaction of the loss offset rules and the standardized statutory tax rate. We predict a significant 
positive coefficient ȕ3 because higher tax rates increase the benefit of loss offsets. Consistent 
with prior literature, we expect more pronounced effects for loss carrybacks than for 
carryforwards because carrybacks deliver an immediate cash refund, are not conditional on 
future profitability, and are not obstructed by potential changes in carryforward rules 
(Langenmayr and Lester 2018).  
For our analysis of H1a and H1b, we use two specifications of CountryRiskFactor: an 
indicator variable equal to one if country j¶s value for the Political Risk or Fiscal Budget Risk is 
a) above the median in year t , and b) in the highest quartile of the country-year t. Otherwise, we 
set CountryRiskFactor equal to zero. We predict a negative effect of CountryRiskFactor (ȕ4 < 0), 
its interaction with the loss offset rules (ȕ5 < 0), and a negative coefficient on ȕ7 that offsets the 
positive effect of ȕ3. We estimate equation (5) separately for both country risk factors. 
 
24 We standardize tax rate CTRStdj,t across the sample so that the tax rate has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1 across the sample (Langenmayr and Lester 2018). This allows us to interpret the coefficient on ȕ1 as the effect of 
loss offset rules on risk-taking given the average corporate tax rate in the sample. 
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We construct two proxies for the respective country risk factors to account for 
differences. First, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann 
at al. (2011) to proxy for political risk. These measures provide cross-country indicators of 
governance and are proxies for political stability (De Jong et al. 2008; Dharmapala and Hines 
2009).25 Following Dharmapala and Hines (2009), we use the yearly mean of the combined 
indicators to proxy for political risk of a country (Political Risk). We standardize the variable to 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one across the sample. 
Second, we use percentage of government debt to GDP as a proxy for Fiscal Budget Risk 
of a country. Prior research suggests that countries use tax policy strategically to manage public 
spending and that the relative debt, as well as credit ratings, constrain governments¶ cash 
outflows (Goncharov and Jacob 2014).26  
We include several firm- and country-level control variables in our regression analysis to 
ensure that our results are not driven by other factors. Ci,j,t is the vector of time-varying country- 
and firm-level control variables. We use Size (the natural logarithm of total assets) because prior 
literature suggests that firm size is associated with lower operating risk since large firms can 
diversify their risk (John et al. 2008). We control for Leverage (ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets) to mitigate concerns that additional risk-taking is associated with increased financial 
distress (De Jong et al. 2008; John et al.2008). ROA captures the firm¶s abilit\ to recover losses 
and invest in risky projects (John et al. 2008; Langenmayr and Lester 2018). We control for 
 
25 The WGI consists of three different categories: selection and monitoring of governments, the capacity of 
governments to implement policies, and the quality of institutions that govern these policies (e.g., enforcement of 
tax payment). Details of the WGI components are described in Appendix D. The WGI Index data start in 1996 and 
are only bi-annually available until 2002. For the years before 1996, we use the 1996 values and for the period from 
1996 to 2002, we use the mean of the respective biannual values. 
26 We do not tabulate results for regressions using credit ratings as Country Risk Factor because of space constraints. 
However, inferences remain the same across all specifications. We obtain government debt data from the OECD and 
IMF Public Debt Database and credit ratings from the Worldscope Database (Oxford Economic Outlook). We again 
standardize both variables across the sample. 
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Sales Growth (defined as the year-to-year percentage change in revenues) and MB (market-to-
book-ratio) to account for investment opportunities (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002).  
We use GDP Growth and Inflation as country-level control variables to ensure that our 
results are not driven by economic conditions that directly or indirectly influence tax policy 
(John et al. 2008; Djankov et al. 2010; Vegh and Vuletin 2015). We obtain data on GDP Growth 
(annual percentage growth rate of GDP in constant 2010 U.S. dollars) from the World Bank 
Database. We define Inflation as the rate of price change in a country measured by the annual 
growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator (World Bank Database). We add Fiscal Budget Risk as 
a control variable when we use Political Risk as Country Risk Factor and vice versa. 
This approach paired with our extensive country sample over 21 years allows us to 
exploit variation from the economic development of a country. We include industry-by-year 
fixed effects Įk,t to account for overall macroeconomic effects in year t. 27 We cluster standard 
errors by country-year and by firm to account for within-firm and within country-year correlation 
in our sample (Petersen 2009).28 For details, see Appendix D.  
3.3 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample comprises both mainly domestically and internationally operating 
companies.29 From the initial sample of 552,462 firm-years, we drop 5,643 firm-year 
observations of cross-listed firms. We eliminate observations from firms in the financial or 
utilities sector (99,396 firm-years) because they are subject to different regulations that likely 
 
27 We use the Fama-French 48 classification to account for industry fixed effects. Our results hold when we use 
Fama-French 12 classification or SIC classification. 
28 In Section 6 we use different specifications of clustering and fixed effects. Inferences do not change. 
29 To mitigate concerns that firms do not only operate in one jurisdiction and hence the exposure to country risk and 
its tax system varies, we construct a dummy variable (Creal, Robinson, Rogers, and Zechman 2014; Langenmayr 
and Lester 2018). We find a stronger effect of corporate tax system changes on corporate risk-taking for domestic 
firms (see Table A.1). Although prior literature indicates that loss affiliates can use transfer pricing instead of loss 
offset rules to exploit the tax value of incurred losses (De Simone, Klassen, and Seidman 2017), we find a negative 
impact of country risk for multinational corporations, which emphasizes the relative importance of country risk. 
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affect risk-taking behavior. We drop observations due to missing risk-taking measures (106,941 
firm-years) and control and country-level variables for final sample (100,710 firm-years). This 
procedure results in an ultimate sample of 239,772 firm-year observations located in 64 
countries. Table 1 presents the sample selection. Table 2 presents the number of firm-year 
observations in the respective countries. About 17.2 percent of the total observations are from the 
United States, followed by Japan (15.9 percent), China (8.1 percent), and India (5.7 percent), and 
Korea (5.6 percent). 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A summarizes the firm- 
and country-level variables of our cross-country sample. We winsorize all firm-level and 
country-level variables (except for corporate tax rate) at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels.30 
The mean (median) for Risk is 0.087 (0.031) which is lower than in the study of Langenmayr and 
Lester (2018) but consistent with John et al. (2008) that uses a sample that is comparable to our 
study. The mean (median) of LCF is 12.8 (10) years and approximately 45 percent of the firm-
year observations are from countries that offer a LCB. The average (median) corporate tax rate is 
32.9 (33.0) percent. The average (median) for Inflation are 2.7 (2.1) percent, Political Risk (mean 
of WGI index) 5.13 (7.18), and Fiscal Budget Risk (government debt to GDP ratio of 73.9 
(63.6)) percent.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Table 4 presents a summary of the distribution of each of the three country risk factors 
for the 64 countries in the sample. Consistent with prior literature (Kaufmann et al. 2011), we 
 
30 We adjust for inflation using each countr\¶s Consumer Price Index in 2010 and convert them into U.S. dollars. 
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document a relatively low Political Risk for OECD countries and a relatively high Political Risk 
for emerging markets. Fiscal Budget Risk, however, is less concentrated in either of the two 
groups. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
Table 5 presents the correlations for our sample. Firm Risk-Taking is negatively 
correlated with Size and ROA. Further, Firm Risk-Taking is positively correlated with both loss 
offset variables providing first evidence of a positive effect of these provisions on corporate risk-
taking. Turning to our macroeconomic and country risk variables, the correlation between 
Inflation and Firm Risk-Taking is negative.31 Further, Government Debt is negatively correlated 
with Firm Risk-Taking providing first evidence for our hypotheses. Importantly, Political Risk 
and Government Debt are negatively correlated supporting our hypotheses to consider these two 
country risk factors separately. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Association between Country Risk and Corporate Risk-Taking 
To test H1a and H1b, we estimate equation (5) separately using Political Risk and Fiscal 
Budget Risk as the Country Risk Factor. We proxy for Country Risk Factor in two ways. First, 
we define Country Risk Factor as an indicator variable equal to one if firm I is domiciled in a 
country whose country risk proxy is above the yearly median of the proxy and zero otherwise 
(Table 6, Panel A). Second, we use an indicator variable equal to one if firm I is domiciled in a 
country whose country risk proxy is in the fourth quartile in year t and zero otherwise (Table 6, 
 
31 We acknowledge high correlations among Inflation, GDP Growth, and our country risk factors. We address this 
concern in our robustness tests in Section 6. 
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Panel B). This design allows us to compare the economic magnitude of the effect of the tax 
system in low (ȕ3, LCF/LCB*CTRStd) vs. high country risk countries (ȕ7, 
LCF/LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor). We expect a more negative impact of country risk in 
the latter specification. 
Table 6, Column (1) presents the results for our specification using Political Risk as 
Country Risk Factor in the interaction term.32 In Panel A the negative and significant (p < 0.05) 
coefficient on Political Risk (-0.005) and LCB*Political Risk provide initial evidence for the 
hypothesized negative impact of country risk on risk-taking. However, we do not find a negative 
effect of country risk factors on the interaction of LCF and CTRStd. The coefficient ȕ3 (I) that 
estimates the effect of LCF and CTRStd is positive (0.001), whereas the coefficient ȕ7 (II) is 
0.000. Results from an F-Test indicate that the sum of the coefficients (I + II) is not significantly 
different from zero (P > F = 0.143). This finding is inconsistent with our prediction. 
Turning to carrybacks, we estimate a significant coefficient ȕ3 for the interaction of LCB 
and CTRStd in countries whose Political Risk is below the yearly median of the proxy. This 
indicates the baseline effect for countries with low Political Risk. The corresponding coefficient 
of LCB*CTRStd is 0.012, translating into an increase of 13.8 percent in risk-taking after the 
enactment of a loss carryback.33 Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we estimate a 
negative coefficient (-0.011) on ȕ7 (both p < 0.05) providing initial evidence of a negative impact 
of Political Risk on corporate risk-taking. Importantly, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests 
that this negative effect attenuates the positive effect estimated for countries with low Political 
 
32 We omit coefficients on other independent variables for brevity. Our coefficients of tax system variables are 
comparable to the findings of Langenmayr and Lester (2018), but of somewhat smaller magnitude. See Table A.1 
for a replication of Langenmayr and Lester (2018) using our sample. 
33 We calculate the effect of 13.8 percent (=0.012/0.087) by dividing the coefficient by the sample mean of Firm 
Risk-Taking. 
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Risk. A F-test indicates that the sum of the coefficients (III + IV) is not different from zero 
indicating an offsetting effect of Political Risk.34 The estimated effects are economically 
significant: The adoption of a loss carryback regime in countries with Political Risk below the 
median (e.g., Spain) is associated with a 13.8 percent increase in corporate risk-taking while a 
carryback rule adoption in countries above the median (e.g., Mexico) is associated with no 
increase in corporate risk-taking.35  
Taken together, our results provide support for H1a for loss carrybacks but not for loss 
carryforwards. This result is consistent with the immediate cash flow effect of a loss carryback 
exerting an especially strong impact on risk-taking. By contrast, loss carryforwards only generate 
tax refunds if future profits are generated and country risk is low. If the tax refund is threatened 
by high country risk, it considerably reduces the tax incentive.36 
To test H1b, we investigate the effect of Fiscal Budget Risk on corporate risk-taking. 
Results are presented in Column (2) of Table 6. Inconsistent with our predictions, we do not find 
a negative impact of country risk for loss carryforwards (sum of the coefficients (I + II) of 0.000 
and 0.002, respectively). However, we find a negative effect of Fiscal Budget Risk on risk-taking 
for loss carrybacks. Specifically, we estimate a positive effect of LCB for countries with Fiscal 
Budget Risk below the median (coefficient 0.011). Consistent with our predictions, we estimate a 
negative coefficient (-0.012) for ȕ7 indicating that Fiscal Budget Risk fully attenuates the positive 
effect of loss carrybacks for loss carrybacks but not for loss carryforwards. The economic 
magnitude of Fiscal Budget Risk is similar to our estimates for Political Risk and is substantial. 
 
34 We test whether the coefficients¶ sum (III + IV = 0.001) equals ]ero and do not reject the null (p-value = 0.922). 
35 In untabulated tests, we also include an index aggregating creditor rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1998; Acharya, Amihud, and Litov 2011). Our results are consistent in both sign and significance. 
36 This finding is consistent with Langenmayr and Lester (2018), who document a negative coefficient of the 
interaction of LCF and tax rate (p. 251). We attribute this inconclusive finding to two factors. First, it is not clear for 
firms whether they will have future profits to use the loss carryforwards. Second, loss offset rules change over time. 
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In Panel B, we re-estimate equation (5) using an indicator variable equal to one if the 
Country Risk Factor is in the fourth quartile and zero otherwise. We find a positive effect of 
country risk for loss carryforwards but find more pronounced effects especially for Political Risk 
(sum of coefficients (III + IV) equal to -0.035) compared to Fiscal Budget Risk (sum of 
coefficients (III + IV) equal to -0.008).37 Overall, we find strong and consistent support for H1a 
and H1b with respect to loss carrybacks but not carryforwards. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
We also assess the appropriateness of our tests comparing countries with high vs. low 
country risky when adopting loss carrybacks by conducting two tests to assess the common 
trends assumption between countries with low and high Country Risk Factor around the adoption 
of LCBs (Roberts and Whited 2013). First, we calculate the percentage growth rate of our Firm 
Risk-Taking (aggregated at the country level) in the period preceding a loss carryback adoption. 
We find statistically indistinguishable growth rates for Firm Risk-Taking (p = 0.58 and p = 0.19 
for Political Risk and Fiscal Budget Risk, respectively). This suggests that our tests meet the 
parallel trends assumptions necessary the comparison of the two country groups. We confirm the 
common trends assumption visually in untabulated figures. 
4.2 Effectiveness of Loss Offset Provisions under Tax Rate Increases and Scaling Effect of 
Tax Rate 
In H2, we predict that a tax rate increase is more likely to discourage risk-taking if 
country risk is high. We restrict our sample to observations three years before and after a tax rate 
 
37 This is consistent with prior literature that documents a significant effect of Political Risk (John et al. 2008), 
especially for countries with a low level of governance and low quality of political institutions. However, the 
negative sums of the coefficients (III + IV) indicate that high country risk environments can lead to negative impacts 
on corporate risk-taking if carrybacks are in place. In untabulated tests, we re-estimate equation (5) using continuous 
values of Country Risk Factor. The coefficients on LCF/LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor provide similar 
inferences. 
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increase (t-3 to t+2) resulting in a sub-sample of 23,255 firm-year observations. This approach 
allows us to investigate the impact of a tax rate increase on corporate risk-taking depending on 
its level of country risk. We present our results in Table 7, Panel A (Panel B) for median splits 
(fourth quartile) of the respective Country Risk Factor. Our results are inconclusive for 
carryforwards. For carrybacks, our results indicate a more pronounced effect of Fiscal Budget 
Risk in both panels (sums of III+IV: 0.006/-0.061 vs. 0.016/-0.029). Again, the negative impact 
of country risk is more pronounced for the fourth quartile of country risk. These results are 
consistent with our findings in H1 and provide additional support for our theoretical model. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
H3 predicts that the negative impact of country risk increases in the underlying corporate 
tax rate. To test this end, we split our sample at the median of corporate tax rates resulting in 
firm-year observations of countries with low (< 33 percent, Columns 1 and 3) and high (> 33 
percent, Columns 2 and 4) corporate tax rates. We present our results in Table 8, Panel A, 
bifurcated between low and high corporate tax rates consisting of 108,886 and 130,862 firm-year 
observations, respectively. 
For carryforwards, we find inconclusive results indicating positive sums of coefficients 
(I+II) in three out of four cases, suggesting a positive effect of country risk. For carrybacks, the 
results in columns (1) and (2) indicate a negative but insignificant effect of Political Risk for 
firms located in countries with high tax rates. The sum of coefficients (III + IV equal to 0.015) in 
Column (1) indicates a less pronounced negative effect of Political Risk for low corporate tax 
rates than for high corporate tax rates (Column 2, III + IV equal to -0.005). Inferences in 
Columns (3) and (4) remain the same for Fiscal Budget Risk, providing initial support for H3. 
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To further corroborate our results, we re-estimate equation (5) limiting our sample only to 
observations three years before and after a tax rate increase (as in our tests of H2). Table 8, Panel 
B presents the results for the two sub-samples consisting of 14,138 and 9,057 firm-year 
observations for low and high corporate tax rates, respectively. Consistent with our predictions 
of H2 and H3, we find the most pronounced effects of country risk for high corporate tax rates. 
Taken together, the findings in Panel A and B provide support for H3. 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
4.3 Country-level Analysis 
Next, we use country-level analyses to investigate the impact of tax policy and country 
risk factors on risky investments that foster economic growth (John et al. 2008). First, we use 
aggregated patent applications at the country level (Patent Applications). We lag this variable by 
three years to account for timing differences between R&D investment and patenting (Broekel 
2015). Second, we use the ratio of a countr\¶s R&D expenditure and GDP (R&D Expenditures / 
GDP). Table 9 presents the results for our estimations and indicates similar inferences as for our 
tests that use our firm risk-taking measure. Combined, these results indicate that country risk 
factors attenuate the positive effect of tax policy to induce risky investments. 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
5. Periods of Heightened Fiscal Budget Risk in the United States 
To mitigate concerns that our results capture the first-order effect of country risk rather 
than its effect on the effectiveness of tax policy, we exploit a narrower setting around the budget 
crises of the federal U.S. government from 2011 to 2013. In this period, the federal government 
suffered a sequence of budget crises that are likely to affect expectations of receiving timely tax 
refunds and the effectiveness of tax policy measures. Hence, U.S. firms faced higher fiscal 
budget risk during the period of the debt ceiling, fiscal cliff, and government shutdown (Hassan 
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et al. 2019).38 Figure 6 depicts the timeline around the three events. In April 2011, Standard & 
Poor¶s set the outlook for U.S. credit rating to negative.39 In December 2012, a scheduled 
reduction in government spending created ³a massive fiscal cliff of large spending cuts and tax 
increases´ (CNN 2012). On October 1, 2013, U.S. Congress failed to pass a budget, resulting in a 
partial government shutdown (The New York Times 2013). 
<Insert Figure 6 about here> 
We exploit a difference-in-differences design and compare risk-taking of U.S. (treatment) 
to Canadian (control) firms around each of the three events. We use firms located in Canada as a 
control group because it is also a member of the G-7 countries with similar economic conditions, 
very similar LCB and LCF provisions in place, and relatively stable fiscal budget risk in our 
sample period. 40 In addition, we are able to obtain quarterly financial data for these two 
countries that allows to assess risk-taking responses closer to the exact date of three event. To 
this end, we construct a sample of 31,654 firm-quarter observations of non-financial firms 
derived from the Compustat Quarterly database (sample period: 2010 Q4 to 2013 Q4). To test 
our prediction of a difference in differences, we estimate the following OLS regression: 
Firm Risk-Taking i,t = Į0 + ȕ1 USi + ȕ2 Postt + ȕ3  USi * Postt + ȕn Ci,j,t + Įk,t + İi,j,t   (6) 
We include indicator variables for the treatment group (USi) and for quarters of the 
heightened fiscal budget risk (Postt). USi is equal to one if a firm is domiciled in the U.S. and 
 
38 In Hassan et al. [2019] this risk is denoted as one form of what the stud\ calls ³political risk´.  
39 This crisis resulted in an increase of debt to GDP ratio and a downgrade of the U.S. credit rating by Standard & 
Poor¶s (S&P) in August 2011. S&P commented their decision citing that ³effectiveness, stabilit\, and predictabilit\ 
of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic 
challenges´ (BBC 2011; The Washington Post 2011). 
40 During our sample period, the loss offset rules only differ in the length of the loss carrybacks (two years in the 
U.S. vs. three years in Canada). However, Canada decreased its statutory corporate tax rate from 28 to 26 percent in 
2012 while the U.S. tax rate was constant. However, the tax rate decrease in Canada might bias against finding a 
negative response of U.S. firms because the benefit of potential tax refunds is reduced for Canadian firms in the post 
period. 
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zero otherwise. Postt (i.e., Post_DC, Post_FC, and Post_GS) is equal to one for firm-quarter 
observations in the quarter in which debt ceiling (2011 Q2), fiscal cliff (2012 Q4), and 
government shutdown occurred (2013 Q4). Postt is equal to zero in quarters before the respective 
budget crisis. In all tests, we use one quarter as post-period. However, we run the test with a one 
and a two quarters pre-period to mitigate concerns that our sub-tests capture (anticipation) effects 
of subsequent events (Roberts and Whited 2013). This approach also ensures that our event 
periods do not overlap. 
Our main coefficient of interest is ȕ3. A negative coefficient on the interaction term 
USi*Postt captures the change in the level of risk-taking from the pre-period to the post-period of 
U.S. firms relative to Canadian firms. We expect a negative coefficient on USi*Postt (ȕ3), which 
would suggest that U.S. firms reduced risk-taking during the post-period. We include firm-level 
control variables.41 We also include industry-by-quarter fixed effects to mitigate concerns that 
unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics might affect the observed changes in corporate 
risk-taking. We use entropy balancing as a matching approach (Hainmueller 2012) to eliminate 
differences, for example, in firm size of U.S. and Canadian firms. Table 3, Panels B and C 
present the descriptive statistics and details on the matched sample.  
We present the results in Table 10 (Panel A) with two quarters (Columns 1-3) and one 
quarter (Columns 4-6) as pre-period. Consistent with our prediction, we find negative and 
significant coefficients on US*Post for two of the three fiscal budget crises. Specifically, we find 
negative but insignificant coefficients on US*Post (p = 0.20 and p = 0.25, respectively) for the 
period around the debt ceiling (Columns 1 and 4). The coefficients on US*Post are negative and 
significant (p < 0.05) for the periods around the fiscal cliff and debt ceiling (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 
 
41 We include the same control variables as in equation (5) and modify these according to Ljungqvist et al. 2017 that 
also uses quarterly Compustat data to construct variables. See Appendix D, Panel E for details. 
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6). These results indicate that U.S. firms decreased risk-taking relative to Canadian firms in the 
quarters of U.S. federal budget crises. Economic magnitudes are similar to our estimates derived 
in the cross-country sample.42 Untabulated tests indicate that the effect is more pronounced for 
firms that experienced a loss in the respective period and firms that do not expect to use their tax 
losses. Overall, these results suggest that firms respond to temporarily heightened fiscal budget 
risk by decreasing risk-taking. This is consistent with a negative impact of country risk on the 
risk-sharing mechanism between firms and the government. 
A crucial requirement for our empirical identification is that covariates evolve uniformly 
in the pre-period (Roberts and Whited 2013). The insignificant coefficients on US in all columns 
in Table 10, Panel A provide initial support for parallel pre-event trends. We conduct several 
additional tests to validate this assumption. First, we re-run equation (6) starting treatment two 
quarters before the actual events in falsification tests. The results of these placebo tests in Table 
10, Panel B indicate no change or an increase in risk-taking of U.S. firms compared to Canadian 
firms, corroborating our baseline findings. Second, we find statistically indistinguishable growth 
rates of Firm Risk-Taking in each pre-event period for U.S. and Canadian firms (p > 0.55, 
untabulated). Lastly, we plot coefficients for the pre-event period for Canadian firms in Figure 7. 
The vertical confidence intervals indicate no significant relative change between groups in the 
pre-event period. Overall, we provide evidence that the parallel trends assumption holds in our 
setting. 
<Insert Figure 7 about here> 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
 
42 In a pooled regression of all three events, we estimate a coefficient on US*Post of about 0.008, which translates 
into a 20 percent reduction in Firm Risk-Taking (evaluated at the sample mean). 
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6. Supplemental Analyses and Robustness Tests 
To mitigate concerns that results in our primary tests are driven by the underlying formal 
restrictiveness of loss offset rules rather than countr\ risk factors, we conduct a ³horse race´ test 
in which we include measures for both potentially limiting factors. To proxy for statutory 
limitations of the future utilization of loss offset provisions, we follow Jacob, Pasedag, and 
Wagner (2011) and calculate the percentages of country-specific present value of tax losses that 
can be offset (Loss_Offset_Restriction) (see Appendix D for further details). We add this 
measure and its respective interaction terms to specification (5). Consistent with our primary 
results, we find an attenuating effect of country risk factors (Table 11, Panel A).43 
One concern with our primary tests is that tax policy reacts to the underlying economic 
changes and is not exogenously determined. This implies that firms in countries with changes in 
loss offset rules/tax rates are not comparable with firms in countries without these changes (Vegh 
and Vuletin 2015). To mitigate this concern, we use group-fixed effects to narrow the 
counterfactuals to firms in countries with similar macroeconomic conditions. Using this 
approach, we can further isolate the effect of tax policy changes. We use the same research 
designs as in equation (5) and apply GDP-Growth-Quartile-Industry-Year fixed effect (Jacob, 
Michaely, and Müller 2019). This approach limits our counterfactuals to firms located in 
countries with comparable economic conditions and development levels. Table 11, Panel B 
presents the results of these tests. Inferences from both, loss carryforwards and carrybacks, and 
country risk factors remain the same but are somewhat less pronounced.  
<Insert Table 11 about here> 
 
43 Due to data limitations, our sample consists of 165,843 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2012 for this test. 
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Next, we conduct several robustness tests that are untabulated to ensure that our results 
are not driven by our risk measure or certain countries. First, we use a modified measure of Firm 
Risk-Taking that is based on a five-year forward-looking horizon. Second, we re-estimate 
equation (5) using the firm-level standard deviation of returns and document similar results in all 
specifications. Third, we remove all observations from countries with a) less than 50 and b) less 
than 200 observations and inferences are unchanged. Finally, we exclude the countries with the 
largest number of observations from our sample (USA, Japan, China, Korea, and India) to 
mitigate concerns about our sample selection procedure and potential effects driven by one 
country. Again, inferences are unchanged. 
7. Conclusion 
This study examines whether country risk factors attenuate the effectiveness of tax policy 
tools aimed at encouraging corporate risk-taking. We show country risk fully attenuates the 
effectiveness of loss offset rules and tax rate changes when firms are located in countries with 
high country risk. Our results indicate the negative impact of country risk is more pronounced 
when countries increase their corporate tax rates and when tax rates are high. Additional tests 
around the U.S. budget crises from 2011 to 2013 suggest the effectiveness of tax policy tools is 
sensitive even in economically well-performing countries when fiscal budget risk is increased 
temporarily. This indicates that high country risk often attenuates the effectiveness even for loss 
carrybacks that are considered effective risk-encouraging policy tools in prior literature. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the risk-sharing mechanism between 
government and companies by showing these mechanisms are not effective in countries with 
high political risk and fiscal budget risk. We also add to research on the design of corporate tax 
systems to incentivize corporate investment and risk-taking (Vegh and Vuletin 2015; IMF 2017). 
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These findings have important policy implications especially in times of economic crises (IMF 
2020). Our findings suggest that effective investment stimuli as measures in recovery strategies 
crucially depend on a reliable budgetary and political environment. Already temporary 
distractions may mitigate the stimulating effect of such tax policy measures. Future research 
could investigate the effective design of policy measures that aim to foster risk-taking and 
investment such as immediate liquidity support for firms during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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APPENDIX A:  
Effect of Risk Aversion on Risk-Taking 
 
For tax rates above the critical tax rate, the higher utility loss due to the loss offset restrictions 
cannot be compensated for by the high weight a risk-averse decision-maker allocates to the tax 
refund. As a consequence, the disutility from taxes on profits dominates the effects with respect 
to losses, leading to an overall disincentive of taxation on risk-taking.  
The direction of the overall tax effect switches for tax rates higher than the critical tax 
rate because 𝐴 (utility from tax refund) decreases in the tax rate such that at the critical tax rate 
𝐴 ൌ 𝐵. For tax rates higher than the critical tax rate the tax effect on profits overcompensates the 
risk-sharing effect from the tax refund to a risk-averse decision-maker in case of loss offset 
restrictions. For high tax rates, the utility loss due to loss offset restrictions in comparison to a 
full loss offset is higher than for low tax rates because of risk aversion (curvature of the utility 
function). The effect of a higher tax rate on the disutility is illustrated in Figure 5. 
<Insert Figure 5 about here> 
Red color indicates a low tax rate (𝑡 ൌ 0.25), while black indicates a high tax rate (𝑡 ൌ 0.5). 
Solid lines depict pre-tax values, dotted lines and dashed lines post-tax values (loss offset 
restriction with 𝜆 ൌ 0.5 is dotted, full loss offset, i.e., 𝜆 ൌ 1, is dashed). The direction of the 
overall tax effect ൫𝐴 ⋛ 𝐵൯ depends on the tax rate, risk aversion, and loss offset provisions.  
An increase in the tax rate reduces after-tax profits decreasing the utility of expected 
after-tax profits (𝐵). Simultaneously, this tax-induced cut in after-tax profits increases the 
marginal utility of the additional profit due to the changed level of risk aversion (curvature of the 
utility function).  
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The tax refund on incurred losses arises only if loss offset provisions are granted (𝜆 > 0). 
Then, an increase in the tax rate increases the government¶s share und thus the firm¶s utilit\ (𝐴).  
However, there are more forces at work in the domain of losses. First, loss offset 
restrictions reduce the utility gain from loss offset ሺ∆𝑈1, ∆𝑈2). This increase in disutility is scaled 
by the tax rate and thus increases in 𝑡. This effect is illustrated in Figure 5 by ∆𝑈1 ൐ ∆𝑈2.  
Second, also, the level of risk-aversion determines the size of 𝐴. The more pronounced 
risk aversion the more utility the decision-maker assigns to the tax refund. As depicted in Figure 
5, higher taxes induce higher tax refunds and thus lower post-tax losses. The resulting lower 
level of risk aversion mitigates the aforementioned first effect. This second effect is illustrated by 
the difference ∆𝑈ଷ ൐ ∆𝑈1. As for lower post-tax losses risk aversion is less pronounced 
(curvature of the utility function), higher tax rates reduce risk aversion in the domain of losses. 
Weaker risk aversion due to higher taxes reduces the utility gain from the tax refund. This 
mechanism is illustrated above. We see that the effect of a tax rate of 25 percent on the change in 
utility is stronger than the effect of an increase in the tax rate by further 25 percent (summing up 
to a tax rate of 50 percent). 
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APPENDIX B:  
Effect of Loss Offset Provisions on Risk-Taking 
 
Building on Domar and Musgrave (1944), we assume a firm that aims to invest a fixed amount 
𝐼 has to choose the level of risk ሺ𝜎ሻ involved. If the firm decides to increase the riskiness of 
investment ሺ𝜎ሻ, the variance of the risky return increases, too. With probability 𝑝 the invested 
amount 𝐼 generates a profit given by the function 𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ with 𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ ൐ 0 (good state of nature), 
with probability ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ a loss of 𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0 is incurred (bad state of nature).  
Consistent with Sandmo (1971), Appelbaum and Katz (1986), Asplund (2002), Janssen 
and Karamychev (2007) and Langenmayr and Lester (2018) we assume the firm maximizes its 
continuously differentiable and concave risk-utility function with 𝑓௚ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൐ 0, 𝑓௕ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0,
𝑓௚
ᇱᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0, 𝑓௕
ᇱᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0. Consistent with this literature, we assume firm level risk-aversion which 
can be interpreted as the manager¶s utilit\ from firm returns. We introduce a corporate tax at rate 
𝑡 and a loss offset coefficient 𝜆 with 𝜆 ൌ 1 describing a full loss offset and 𝜆 ൌ 0 the absence of 
loss offset provisions. If 𝜆 ൏ 1 then loss offset is restricted. The expected risk-utility from the 
risky investment is 
𝐸ሾ𝑈ሿ ൌ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑈ൣሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ ∙ ൫𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼൯൧ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ ∙ 𝑈ሾሺ1 െ 𝜆𝑡ሻ ∙ ሺ𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼ሻሿ,  (7) 
with the net of taxes utilities 𝑈ൣሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ൫𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼൯൧ ൌ 𝑈ൣ൫𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼൯൧ െ 𝐵, where 𝐵 denotes the 
tax payment on the profit in the good state of nature, and 𝑈ሾሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻሺ𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼ሻሿ ൌ
𝑈ሾሺ𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼ሻሿ ൅ 𝐴, where 𝐴 denotes the tax refund from loss offset in the bad state of nature 
(Langenmayr and Lester 2018). Due to risk-aversion, the utility gain from a full tax refund is 
larger than a corresponding expected utility loss from taxes on profits (𝐴 ൐ 𝐵) (Domar and 
Musgrave 1944; Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; Langenmayr and Lester 2018).  
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Consistent with the Domar-Musgrave framework, the firm decides on the optimal 
riskiness of the investment according to the first order condition (𝐹𝑂𝐶): 
డ𝐸ൣ𝑈ሾሺ𝜋ሻሿ൧
డ𝜎
ൌ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑈ᇱൣ𝜋௚൧ ∙ ሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ ∙ 𝑓௚
ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ ∙ 𝑈ᇱሾ𝜋௕ሿ ∙ ሺ1 െ 𝜆𝑡ሻ ∙ 𝑓௕
ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൌ 0, (8) 
where 𝜋௚ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ ∙ ൫𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼൯ ൐ 0 and 𝜋௕ ൌ ሺ1 െ 𝜆𝑡ሻ ∙ ሺ𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ െ 𝐼ሻ ൏ 0 denote the after-tax 
profit and loss in either state of the world. Finally, we obtain 
ௗ𝜎
ௗ𝜆
ൌ
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శ
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ۙ
 
 
 
 
  𝑆𝑂𝐶<0
൐ 0 (9) 
with the second order condition, 𝑆𝑂𝐶 ൌ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑈ᇱᇱൣ𝜋௚൧ ∙ ሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ2 ∙ ቀ𝑓௚ᇱሺ𝜎ሻቁ
2
൅ 𝑝 ∙ 𝑈ᇱൣ𝜋௚൧ ∙ ሺ1 െ 𝑡ሻ ∙
𝑓௚
ᇱᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ ∙ 𝑈ᇱᇱሾ𝜋௕ሿ ∙ ሺ1 െ 𝜆𝑡ሻ
2 ∙ ൫𝑓௕
ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ൯
2
൅ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ ∙ 𝑈ᇱሾ𝜋௕ሿ ∙ ሺ1 െ 𝜆𝑡ሻ ∙ 𝑓௕
ᇱᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0, in 
the denominator (Langenmayr and Lester 2018). The 𝑆𝑂𝐶 is fulfilled as  𝑓௚ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൐ 0,   𝑓௕ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0,
𝑓௚
ᇱᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0,   𝑓௕
ᇱᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0,  𝑈ᇱൣ𝜋௚൧ ൐ 0,   𝑈
ᇱሾ𝜋௕ሿ ൐ 0, 𝑈
ᇱᇱൣ𝜋௚൧ ൏ 0  and  𝑈ᇱᇱሾ𝜋௕ሿ ൏ 0. Hence, we 
find a uniform positive effect of a marginal increase in loss offset provisions on risk-taking. 
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APPENDIX C:  
Effect of Tax Rate on Risk-Taking 
 
By contrast, the effect of a tax rate increase is ambiguous.  
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  𝑆𝑂𝐶<0
⋛ 0. (10) 
 
As the second order condition (𝑆𝑂𝐶) in the denominator has a uniform sign, which of the 
opposing effects prevails depends on the relation of the probability of a good state, the level of 
risk-aversion and the tax rate displayed in the numerator. 
Substituting for the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝑅𝑅ሺ𝜋ሻ ൌ
െ
𝑈ᇲᇲሾ𝜋ሿ
𝑈ᇲሾ𝜋ሿ
|𝜋| , we obtain,  ௗ𝜎
ௗ𝑡
ൌ െ
𝑝∙𝑈ᇲൣ𝜋೒൧∙𝑓೒ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ∙ሾ𝑅ೃሺ𝜋ሻ−1ሿ−𝜆∙ሺ1−𝑝ሻ∙𝑈ᇲሾ𝜋್ሿ∙𝑓
ᇲሺ𝜎ሻ∙ሾ𝑅ೃሺ𝜋ሻ+1ሿ
𝑆𝑂𝐶
⋛ 0. The 𝑆𝑂𝐶 
is negative (see Appendix B). Examining the numerator clarifies that risk-taking increases in the 
tax rate for  
   𝑅𝑅  ൐  0  if  𝑝 𝑈ᇱൣ𝜋௚൧ ∙ 𝑓௚ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ ൑ െሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ𝑈ᇱሾ𝜋௕ሿ ∙ ሺ1 െ 𝑝ሻ ∙ 𝑓௕ᇱሺ𝜎ሻ1 െ 𝑝 as   ௗ𝜎ௗ𝑡ቚ𝜆→1 ൐ 0       (11)  (Langenmayr and Lester 2018, 14). This equation illustrates that the level of risk aversion 
determines which one of the opposing effects in the numerator ultimately dominates.  
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APPENDIX D:  
Variable Definitions 
 Panel A: Firm-Level Variables – Cross-Country Sample 
Source: Thomson Reuters¶ Worldscope Database 
Variable Description and Source 
Domestic Indicator variable for foreign operations. The variable is equal to one if a firm 
reports less than 10 percent of income, sales, and assets as foreign (Creal et al. 
2014; Langenmayr and Lester 2018). Source: Worldscope. 
Firm Risk-
Taking 
Three-year firm risk-taking proxy: Three-year earnings volatility measure 
(John et al. 2008; Langenmayr and Lester 2018). It is defined as the standard 
deviation over three \ears of a firm¶s ROA¶s deviation from the industr\-
country specific average ROA. RISK3y = ට 1
2
∑  ሺ𝐸୧ୡ୨୲ െ   
1
ଷ
 ∑ 𝐸୧ୡ୨୲ 
ଷ
𝑡=1 ሻ
ଷ
𝑡=1  2 , 
where Eicjt = ROAijct ± 
1
ே௝௖𝑡
 ∑ 𝑅𝑂𝐴௞௝௖𝑡
ே௝௖𝑡
௞=1 . RISK3y and ROA are winsorized at 
1% and 99%. Source: Worldscope. 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities (XWC 03351) to total assets (WC02999), winsorized 
at 1% and 99%. Source: Worldscope. 
MB 
 
Market-to-Book Ratio: Ratio of market capitalization (WC08001) to common 
equity (WC03501), winsorized at 1% and 99%. Source: Worldscope. 
ROA Return on assets: ratio of EBIT (WC18191) over assets (WC 02999), where 
EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Source: 
Worldscope. 
Sales Growth Sales Growth: Year-to-year percentage change in revenues (WC01001), 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. Source: Worldscope. 
Size Firm Size: Natural logarithm of total assets in 1000 U.S. dollars (constant 2010 
U.S. dollars) (WC02999), winsorized at 1% and 99%. Source: Worldscope. 
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Panel B: Country-Level Tax Variables 
Source: Coopers & Lybrand International Tax Summaries; 
Tax Handbooks published by Ernst & Young, PwC 
Variable Description 
CTR Countr\¶s statutory corporate tax rate. We compute this by 
including central and sub-central/local rates. In case that the tax 
system is progressive, we use the top marginal tax rate. 
CTRStd Standardized corporate tax rate (CTR) (over sample period). Mean 
is 0 and standard deviation is 1. 
LCB Loss carryback equals one if the country has a loss carryback in 
place and zero if the country does not.  
LCF Loss carryforward is the period for which losses can be carried 
forward, in years. If losses can be carried forward indefinitely, we 
set the value to 20 years. 
Loss_Offset_Restriction Percentages of country-specific present value of tax losses that can 
be offset for a time horizon of 20 years. We assume a constant 
profit stream for periods 𝑡 ൌ 1 to 𝑡 ൌ 20 such that a specific loss 
that occurs in period 𝑡 ൌ 0 can be completely offset over 20 years 
under an unrestricted loss carryforward. Then, we introduce 
country-specific institutional loss offset regulations, i.e., loss 
carrybacks and loss carryforward with country-specific restrictions 
in time and amount) and determine the share of used losses of 
overall losses in present value terms. For ease of interpretation, we 
standardize the variable over the sample period and multiply it by -
1 so that a less negative value reflects more restrictive loss offset 
and can be interpreted in a similar way as country risk factors.  
Source: Own calculations, consistent with the determination of 
present values for used corporate losses by Jacob et al. (2011), 82.  
 
Panel C: Country-Level Variables 
Source: The World Bank (WGI) and IMF 
Variable Description 
Country Investment Variables 
Patent 
Applications 
Logarithm of patent applications by residents in a country. We lag this 
variable by three years to account for timing differences between R&D 
investment and patenting (Broekel 2015). Source: The World Bank (WGI). 
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R&D Expenditures 
/ GDP 
Ratio of a countr\¶s total research and development expenditure to the 
countr\¶s GDP. Source: The World Bank (WGI). 
  
Country Control Variables 
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.  
Inflation Quartile rank of countr\¶s inflation rate in a sample \ear. Inflation is the 
rate of price change in a country measured by the annual growth rate of the 
GDP implicit deflator. 
Country Risk Variables 
Country Risk 
Factor 
Indicator variable equal to one if a firm is located in a country whose 
country risk indicator in year t is above the median (in the fourth quartile) 
of the sample year and zero otherwise.  
Fiscal Budget Risk 
Government Debt  Countr\¶s percentage of gross debt of central government to countr\¶s GDP 
in a sample year, standardized over the sample period. Source: IMF 
Economic Outlook. 
Country Credit 
Rating 
Countr\¶s annual credit rating index in a respective year. A value of 1 
captures a ³D´ rating of a countr\. A value of 20 an ³AAA´ rating. We 
standardize the variable over the sample period. Source: Worldscope, 
Oxford Economic Outlook. 
Political Risk  
Political Risk Composite governance index of a countr\¶s (unweighted) mean of 
combined WGI measures (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of 
Corruption) in a sample year (Dharmapala and Hines 2009). For ease of 
interpretation, we standardize the variable over the sample period and 
multiply it by -1 so that a higher value reflects higher political risk.  
Source: The World Bank (WGI).  
Voice and 
Accountability 
Yearl\ estimate of a countr\¶s perceptions of the extent to which a 
country¶s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as 
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
(WB). 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
Yearly estimate of perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically‐motivated violence and terrorism (WB).  
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Government 
Effectiveness 
Yearly estimate of perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government¶s commitment to such policies (WB).  
Regulatory Quality Yearly estimate of perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development (WB).  
Rule of Law Yearly estimate of perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence (WB).  
Control of 
Corruption 
Yearly estimate of perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ³capture´ of the state by elites and private interests 
(WB).  
  
Panel E: Variables for Difference-in-Differences Analysis – U.S.-Canadian Sample 
Source: Compustat 
Variable Description 
Firm Risk-Taking Three-year firm risk-taking proxy: Three-year earnings volatility measure 
(John et al. 2008; Langenmayr and Lester 2018). It is defined as the 
standard deviation over three \ears of a firm¶s ROA¶s deviation from the 
industry-country specific average ROA. RISK3y = 
ට 
1
2
∑  ሺ𝐸୧ୡ୨୲ െ   
1
ଷ
 ∑ 𝐸୧ୡ୨୲ 
ଷ
𝑡=1 ሻ
ଷ
𝑡=1  2 , where Eicjt = ROAijct ± 
1
ே௝௖𝑡
 
∑ 𝑅𝑂𝐴௞௝௖𝑡
ே௝௖𝑡
௞=1 . RISK3y and ROA are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Source: 
Worldscope. 
Leverage Long-term debt (Compustat item dltt) over the book value of assets 
(Compustat item at). 
MB Ratio of the market value of equity (Compustat items prcc_f × csho) to the 
book value of equity (Compustat item ceq). 
Post Indicator variable equal to one if a firm-quarter observation t is in the post-
event period, and equal to zero if it is in the quarter/one of the two quarters 
prior to the respective budget crisis event. Post_DC is equal to one for 
firm-quarters in Q2 2011 and equal to zero for firm-quarters in Q4 2010 or 
Q1 2011. Post_FC is equal to one for firm-quarters in Q4 2012 and equal 
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to zero for firm-quarters in Q2 2012 or Q3 2012. Post_GS is equal to one 
for firm-quarters in Q4 2013 and equal to zero for firm-quarters in Q2 2013 
or Q3 2013. 
Post_Placebo Indicator variable equal to one for placebo event two quarters prior to the 
respective budget crisis and onwards, zero otherwise. 
ROA Operating income after depreciation (Compustat item oiadpq) over the 
book value of assets (Compustat item atq). 
Sales Growth Log of current year sales over last year sales (Compustat item sale). 
Size Book value of total assets (Compustat item at). 
US Indicator variable with the value of one if the firm is domiciled in the 
United States, and zero if it is domiciled in Canada. 
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FIGURE 1:  
Optimal Risk-Taking 𝝈 as a Function of the Tax Rate 𝒕  
for Various Loss Offset Provisions 𝝀 
 
This figure illustrates optimal risk-taking under relative risk-aversion for different levels of loss-
offset. E.g., for a logarithmic risk utility function risk-taking (𝜎) increases under a full loss offset 
(𝜆 ൌ 1) in the tax rate ሺ𝑡ሻ . Under more restrictive loss offset rules (e.g., 𝜆 ൌ 0.6ሻ the risk sharing 
mechanism induces increased risk-taking for tax rates that do not exceed a specific critical tax rate 
(e.g., for 𝜆 ൌ 0.6 and 𝑡 ൌ 46%ሻ, while risk-taking decreases in the tax rate for higher tax rates 
(e.g., for 𝜆 ൌ 0.6 and 𝑡 ൒ 46%ሻ. Obviously, depending on the level of loss offset provision, the 
tax incentive from loss offset provisions on risk-taking is neutralized by the income effect of higher 
tax rates at a critical tax rate and reverses for higher tax rates. 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculation. 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3297418
  - 50 - 
FIGURE 2:  
Benefit from Tax Refund on a Tax Loss (A) in Comparison to 
the Disutility from Taxes on Profits (B) 
 
This figure illustrates the utility effects exemplified for a tax rate 𝑡 of 30% under full loss offset 
ሺ𝜆 ൌ 1ሻ, a loss offset of 50% ሺ𝜆 ൌ 0.5ሻ or no loss offset ሺ𝜆 ൌ 0ሻ for a risk-averse decision-maker. 
𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ with 𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ ൐ 0  describes the profit generated by the invested amount 𝐼 in the good state of 
nature. 𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ with 𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0 describes the loss incurred in the bad state of nature. 
 
 
 
Source: modified from Langenmayr and Lester (2018), own calculations. 
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FIGURE 3:  
Optimal Risk-Taking as a Function of the Tax Rate  
for Various Loss Offset Provisions Considering Country Risk 
 
This figure illustrates the effect of country risk (𝜃) on the reversal of the tax incentive from loss 
offset provisions on risk-taking in absence of country risk (𝜎) and with explicit country risk (𝜎ො) as 
a function of the tax rate (𝑡) for different levels of loss offset provisions ሺ𝜆ሻ. 𝜃 ൌ 1 describes the 
absence of country risk while 𝜃 ൏ 0.7 describes a country of investment that is characterized by 
political or fiscal budget risk. Thus, optimal risk-taking in absence of country risk is illustrated by 
solid lines while optimal risk-taking adjusted for country risk is plotted as dashed lines. The lower 
𝜆 the more restrictive is the underlying loss offset provision. Obviously, the optimal risk-taking 
decreases in face of country risk. Moreover, the critical tax rate (illustrated by circles, i.e., 
neutralization of tax incentive) also decreases in face of country risk (risk-taking maxima/circles 
of dashed lines in comparison to the risk-taking maxima/circles of solid lines). 
 
 
Source: own calculation.  l=0,75 l=1 l=0,75 l=1
Effect of country risk on effectiveness of 
loss offset provisions
Effectiveness of loss offset provisions in face of tax rate increases 
• low tax rate: more risk-taking
• high tax rate: less risk-taking
Scaling effect of tax rate
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FIGURE 4:  
Countries Covered in Cross-Country Sample 
This figure indicates those countries that are in our sample. Countries highlighted in black are in 
our sample and countries shaded in grey are not in our sample. 
 
 
Source: own calculations. 
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FIGURE 5:  
Decrease in Utility Due to Loss Offset Restrictions for Different Tax Rate Levels 
 
This figure illustrates the effect of risk aversion on the decrease in utility for different tax rate 
levels exemplified for a tax rate 𝑡 of  𝑡௅ ൌ 25% and of 𝑡ு ൌ 50% under full loss offset ሺ𝜆 ൌ 1ሻ 
and a loss offset of 50 percent ሺ𝜆 ൌ 0.5ሻ. 𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ with 𝑓௚ሺ𝜎ሻ ൐ 0  describes the profit generated by 
the invested amount 𝐼 in the good state of nature. 𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ with 𝑓௕ሺ𝜎ሻ ൏ 0 describes the loss incurred 
in the bad state of nature. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculations. 
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FIGURE 6:  
Timeline of Events around U.S. Budget Crises 
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FIGURE 7:  
Visual Common Trends – U.S.-Canadian Sample 
This figure presents graphical evidence on the effect of heightened fiscal budget risk on corporate risk-taking 
during the three federal U.S. budget crises from 2011 to 2013. Panel A presents the two quarters prior and the 
quarter in which the debt ceiling occurred (2011 Q2). Panel B presents the two quarters prior and the quarter in 
which the fiscal cliff occurred (2012 Q4). Panel C presents the two quarters prior and the quarter in which the 
government shutdown occurred (2013 Q4). The x-axis depicts quarters around the respective budget crisis event. 
The y-axis depicts the yearly coefficient of the interaction 𝑈𝑆 ൈ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 of regression equation (6) representing the 
increase/decrease in Firm Risk-Taking of U.S. firms relative to Canadian firms. Quarterly solid vertical lines 
indicate the confidence interval at the 95%-level. Variables are defined in Appendix D. 
 
Panel A: Debt Ceiling (2011 Q2)  Panel B: Fiscal Cliff (2012 Q4) 
 
 
 
   
Panel C: Government Shutdown (2013 Q4)   
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TABLE 1:  
Sample Selection 
This table describes the sample selection. Panel A presents the sample selection for the cross-country sample over the 
period from 1992 to 2012. Panel A presents the sample selection for the U.S.-Canadian sample of our difference-in-
differences setting over the period from 2010 Q4 to 2013 Q4. 
Panel A: Cross-Country Sample 
 Step Description 
No. of 
observations 
dropped 
No. of 
observations 
remaining 
1 
 
All firms listed in Thomson Reuters¶ Worldscope Database with 
non-missing data for total assets (1992-2014) 
 552,462 
2 Less: observations of cross-listed firms (5,643) 546,819 
3 Less: observations of firms in the financial or utilities sector (99,396) 447,423 
4 Less: observations with missing risk-taking measures (106,941) 340,482 
5 Less: observations with missing control and country-level variables  (100,710) 239,772 
 
Panel B: U.S.-Canadian Sample 
 Step Description 
No. of 
observations 
dropped 
No. of 
observations 
remaining 
1 
 
All U.S. and Canadian firms listed in Compustat Database with non-
missing quarterly data for total assets (2010 Q4-2013 Q4) 
 174,908 
2 Less: observations of firms in the financial or utilities sector (72,009) 102,899 
3 Less: observations with missing risk-taking measures (24,049) 78,850 
4 Less: observations with missing control variables (47,196) 31,654 
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TABLE 2:  
Cross-Country Sample Composition 
This table summarizes the number of 239,772 observations per country in our cross-country 
sample over the period from 1992 to 2012.  
Country Obs.  Country Obs.  Country Obs.  
Argentina 586  India 13,715  Philippines 1,372  
Australia 9,898  Indonesia 3,586  Poland 2,232  
Austria 736  Ireland 659  Portugal 580  
Belgium 1,031  Israel 2,184  Romania 487  
Brazil 2,013  Italy 1,964  Russia 1,023  
Bulgaria 827  Japan 38,050  Singapore 4,961  
Canada 7,503  Jordan 377  Slovak Rep. 58  
Chile 1,555  Kazakhstan 7  South Africa 2,437  
China 19,365  Kenya 166  Spain 1,329  
Colombia 202  Korea 13,494  Sweden 3,000  
Croatia 405  Latvia 56  Switzerland 2,315  
Czech Rep. 44  Lithuania 138  Thailand 5,170  
Denmark 1,453  Luxembourg 188  Tunisia 154  
Egypt 516  Malaysia 8,628  Turkey 2,249  
Finland 1,419  Mexico 1,179  Uganda 2  
France 6,025  Morocco 214  Ukraine 102  
Germany 6,400  Netherlands 1,398  United Kingdom 10,229  
Ghana 59  New Zealand 775  United States 41,167  
Greece 1,735  Nigeria 147  Venezuela 55  
Hong Kong  8,683  Norway 1,195  Zimbabwe 2  
Hungary 180  Pakistan 1,308     
Iceland 50  Peru 735     
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T
A
B
L
E
 3:  
D
escriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of our analyses. Panel A
 presents sum
m
ary statistics for the cross-country sam
ple of our m
ain variables 
for 25,906 firm
s and 239,772 firm
-year observations over the period from
 1992 to 2012. Panel B
 presents sum
m
ary statistics for 4,428 firm
s 
and 31,654 firm
-quarter observations over the period from
 2010 to 2013 for the U
.S.-C
anadian sam
ple in the difference-in-differences 
analysis. Panel B
 presents the results of the entropy m
atching procedure. M
atching w
as perform
ed based on covariates of Size, Leverage, 
Sales G
row
th, RO
A, and M
B prior to the budget crises. The table reports the m
eans for Size, Leverage, Sales G
rowth, RO
A, and M
B for U
.S. 
firm
s and C
anadian firm
s before and after entropy balancing. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 level, respectively. 
A
ll continuous variables are w
insorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. V
ariables are defined in A
ppendix D
. 
Panel A
: D
escriptive Statistics of C
ross-C
ountry Sam
ple 
V
ariable 
N
 
M
ean 
SD
  
P5 
P25 
M
edian 
P75 
P95 
Firm
 Risk-Taking 
239,772 
0.087 
0.183 
0.000 
0.012 
0.031 
0.081 
1.352 
Size 
239,772 
12.043 
2.133 
6.317 
10.707 
12.030 
13.393 
17.296 
Leverage 
239,772 
0.527 
0.354 
0.024 
0.321 
0.501 
0.661 
2.744 
Sales G
row
th 
239,772 
0.209 
0.795 
-0.884 
-0.040 
0.073 
0.228 
6.072 
RO
A 
239,772 
0.002 
0.300 
-2.049 
0.010 
0.057 
0.108 
0.378 
M
B 
239,772 
2.159 
3.426 
-8.429 
0.712 
1.361 
2.564 
22.362 
LCF 
239,772 
12.846 
6.921 
0.000 
5.000 
10.000 
20.000 
20.000 
LCB 
239,772 
0.457 
0.498 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
1.000 
1.000 
CTR 
239,772 
0.329 
0.078 
0.100 
0.280 
0.330 
0.390 
0.582 
G
D
P G
row
th 
239,772 
0.073 
0.098 
-0.171 
0.017 
0.066 
0.129 
0.305 
Inflation 
239,772 
0.027 
0.036 
-0.034 
0.008 
0.021 
0.039 
0.181 
Political Risk 
239,772 
5.134 
4.526 
-4.865 
1.962 
7.184 
8.606 
11.004 
Control of Corruption 
239,772 
0.973 
0.962 
-0.986 
0.125 
1.265 
1.766 
2.390 
G
overnm
ent Effectiveness 
239,772 
1.148 
0.721 
-0.451 
0.524 
1.459 
1.697 
2.229 
Political Stability 
239,772 
0.370 
0.781 
-1.678 
-0.090 
0.595 
0.980 
1.441 
Regulatory Q
uality 
239,772 
0.982 
0.737 
-0.541 
0.490 
1.146 
1.593 
2.015 
Rule of Law 
239,772 
0.993 
0.783 
-0.826 
0.417 
1.319 
1.589 
1.948 
Voice and Accountability 
239,772 
0.667 
0.880 
-1.666 
0.422 
0.998 
1.312 
1.656 
G
overnm
ent D
ebt 
239,772 
0.739 
0.545 
0.097 
0.349 
0.636 
0.860 
2.373 
Country D
ebt Rating 
239,772 
16.700 
3.849 
0.001 
14.250 
18.333 
19.889 
20.000 
Patent Applications 
238,021 
9.796 
2.658 
5.142 
7.654 
10.001 
12.341 
12.816 
R&
D
 Expenditures / G
D
P 
209,307 
2.087 
0.994 
0.532 
1.130 
2.212 
2.819 
3.461 
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T
A
B
L
E
 3:  
D
escriptive Statistics (continued) 
Panel B
: D
escriptive Statistics of U
.S.-C
anadian Sam
ple 
 
Full Sam
ple 
 
U
.S. 
 
C
A
 
 
N
 
M
ean 
SD
 
M
edian 
 
N
 
M
ean 
SD
 
M
edian 
 
N
 
M
ean 
SD
 
M
edian 
Firm
 Risk Taking 
31,654 
0.040 
0.103 
0.015 
 
25,733 
0.038 
0.102 
0.014 
 
5,921 
0.048 
0.109 
0.021 
Size 
31,654 
10.273 
2.566 
10.487 
 
25,733 
10.384 
2.571 
10.602 
 
5,921 
9.791 
2.486 
9.956 
Leverage 
31,654 
0.181 
0.227 
0.109 
 
25,733 
0.187 
0.234 
0.114 
 
5,921 
0.155 
0.195 
0.092 
Sales G
row
th 
31,654 
0.095 
0.588 
0.069 
 
25,733 
0.090 
0.565 
0.068 
 
5,921 
0.117 
0.681 
0.076 
RO
A 
31,654 
-0.026 
0.167 
0.014 
 
25,733 
-0.025 
0.169 
0.016 
 
5,921 
-0.031 
0.160 
0.008 
M
B 
31,654 
2.627 
7.862 
1.878 
 
25,733 
2.820 
8.169 
2.011 
 
5,921 
1.789 
6.287 
1.411 
 Panel C
: R
esults of E
ntropy B
alancing – U
.S.-C
anadian Sam
ple 
 
M
ean after  
Entropy Balancing 
 
M
ean before  
Entropy Balancing 
 
U
.S. 
C
A
 
D
iff. 
 
U
.S. 
C
A
 
D
iff. 
Size 
10.360 
10.360 
 
 
10.360 
9.908 
*** 
Leverage 
0.183 
0.183 
 
 
0.183 
0.151 
*** 
Sales G
row
th 
0.096 
0.096 
 
 
0.096 
0.139 
*** 
RO
A 
-0.022 
-0.022 
 
 
-0.022 
-0.020 
 
M
B 
2.635 
2.630 
 
 
2.635 
1.774 
*** 
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TABLE 4:  
Distribution of Country Risk Factors in Cross-Country Sample 
This table presents the distribution of the quartiles of the respective country risk factors for the countries in the 
sample for our full sample. The quartiles are based on the yearly rank of the country within the respective risk 
measure. 
Country Obs  Political Risk  Fiscal Budget Risk 
  Mean SD P25 P50 P75  Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
Argentina 586  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.594 0.900 2.000 2.000 3.000 
Australia 9,898  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Austria 736  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.829 0.376 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Belgium 1,031  1.929 0.257 2.000 2.000 2.000  3.933 0.250 4.000 4.000 4.000 
Brazil 2,013  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.756 0.548 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Bulgaria 827  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Canada 7,503  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  3.200 0.400 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Chile 1,555  2.729 0.477 2.000 3.000 3.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
China 19,365  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Colombia 202  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.623 0.486 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Croatia 405  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  1.696 0.461 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Czech Rep. 44  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  1.186 0.394 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Denmark 1,453  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.019 0.606 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Egypt 516  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  3.222 0.416 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Finland 1,419  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.933 0.250 2.000 2.000 2.000 
France 6,025  2.351 0.477 2.000 2.000 3.000  2.664 0.601 2.000 3.000 3.000 
Germany 6,400  1.122 0.328 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.628 0.483 2.000 3.000 3.000 
Ghana 59  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.500 0.505 1.000 1.500 2.000 
Greece 1,735  3.108 0.311 3.000 3.000 3.000  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 
Hong Kong 8,683  1.527 0.589 1.000 1.000 2.000  1.096 0.295 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hungary 180  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  2.609 0.489 2.000 3.000 3.000 
Iceland 50  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.900 1.344 1.000 4.000 4.000 
India 13,715  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Indonesia 3,586  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.815 0.923 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Ireland 659  1.163 0.370 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.329 1.252 1.000 2.000 4.000 
Israel 2,184  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  3.191 0.393 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Italy 1,964  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 
Japan 38,050  2.628 0.483 2.000 3.000 3.000  3.984 0.127 4.000 4.000 4.000 
Jordan 377  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.784 0.412 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Kazakhstan 7  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Kenya 166  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.012 0.109 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Korea 13,494  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Latvia 56  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  1.382 0.490 1.000 1.000 2.000 
Lithuania 138  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  1.452 0.500 1.000 1.000 2.000 
Luxembourg 188  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Malaysia 8,628  3.317 0.465 3.000 3.000 4.000  1.988 0.170 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Mexico 1,179  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.954 0.209 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Morocco 214  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.146 0.354 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Netherlands 1,398  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.353 0.478 2.000 2.000 3.000 
New Zealand 775  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.279 0.449 1.000 1.000 2.000 
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Country Obs  Political Risk  Fiscal Budget Risk 
  Mean SD P25 P50 P75  Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
Nigeria 147  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.020 0.142 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Norway 1,195  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  1.585 0.493 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Pakistan 1,308  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.417 0.493 2.000 2.000 3.000 
Peru 735  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.414 0.493 1.000 1.000 2.000 
Philippines 1,372  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.151 0.358 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Poland 2,232  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  2.000 0.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Portugal 580  2.633 0.497 2.000 3.000 3.000  2.686 0.796 2.000 2.000 3.000 
Romania 487  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.112 0.316 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Russia 1,023  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.031 0.219 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Singapore 4,961  1.056 0.229 1.000 1.000 1.000  3.784 0.412 4.000 4.000 4.000 
Slovak Rep. 58  3.000 0.000 3.000 3.000 3.000  1.750 0.437 1.500 2.000 2.000 
South Africa 2,437  3.399 0.490 3.000 3.000 4.000  1.650 0.477 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Spain 1,329  2.816 0.388 3.000 3.000 3.000  2.242 0.428 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Sweden 3,000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.132 0.339 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Switzerland 2,315  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  2.211 0.408 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Thailand 5,170  3.970 0.172 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.902 0.298 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Tunisia 154  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.000 0.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Turkey 2,249  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  2.144 0.390 2.000 2.000 2.000 
Uganda 2  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ukraine 102  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.990 0.099 2.000 2.000 2.000 
UK 10,229  1.422 0.494 1.000 1.000 2.000  2.347 0.650 2.000 2.000 3.000 
United States 41,167  1.787 0.409 2.000 2.000 2.000  2.895 0.713 2.000 3.000 3.000 
Venezuela 55  4.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 4.000  1.556 0.572 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Zimbabwe 2  2.490 1.116 1.000 2.000 3.000  2.481 1.116 1.000 2.000 3.000 
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T
A
B
L
E
 5:  
C
orrelation T
able 
These tables provide Pearson correlations for the cross-country (Panel A
) and U
.S.-C
anadian (Panel B
) sam
ples. B
old letters denote statistical significance at 
the 1 percent level. 
Panel A
: C
ross-C
ountry Sam
ple 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(1) Firm
 Risk-Taking 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Size 
-0.341 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) Leverage 
0.293 
-0.057 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) Sales G
rowth 
0.076 
-0.076 
-0.023 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5) RO
A 
-0.634 
0.395 
-0.400 
-0.045 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6) M
B 
0.024 
-0.003 
-0.131 
0.086 
0.039 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) LCF 
0.243 
-0.105 
0.011 
0.064 
-0.167 
0.06 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(8) LCB 
0.131 
0.057 
0.071 
-0.020 
-0.11 
0.018 
0.357 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(9) CTR 
-0.001 
0.114 
0.118 
-0.039 
-0.027 
0.015 
-0.102 
0.288 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(10) G
D
P G
rowth 
-0.022 
-0.043 
-0.053 
0.063 
0.047 
0.050 
-0.101 
-0.211 
-0.212 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(11) Inflation 
-0.016 
-0.097 
-0.011 
0.082 
0.062 
0.038 
-0.070 
-0.283 
-0.259 
0.419 
1 
 
 
 
 
(12) Political Risk 
-0.170 
-0.001 
-0.013 
-0.006 
0.152 
-0.005 
-0.554 
-0.497 
-0.193 
0.338 
0.564 
1 
 
 
 
(13) G
overnm
ent D
ebt 
-0.104 
0.147 
0.052 
-0.098 
0.030 
-0.097 
-0.241 
0.134 
0.536 
-0.275 
-0.482 
-0.259 
1 
 
 
(14) Country D
ebt Rating 
0.156 
0.072 
0.036 
0.004 
-0.153 
0.065 
0.366 
0.447 
0.365 
-0.241 
-0.536 
-0.736 
0.180 
1 
 
(15) Loss_O
ffset_Restriction 
-0.243 
0.076 
-0.049 
-0.058 
0.183 
-0.04 
-0.991 
-0.418 
-0.026 
0.195 
0.135 
0.611 
-0.628 
-0.623 
1 
 Panel B
: U
.S.-C
anadian Sam
ple 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(1) Firm
 Risk-Taking 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Size 
-0.107 
1 
 
 
 
 
(3) Leverage 
0.012 
0.199 
1 
 
 
 
(4) Sales G
rowth 
-0.048 
0.029 
-0.003 
1 
 
 
(5) RO
A 
-0.204 
0.509 
-0.047 
0.056 
1 
 
(6) M
B 
-0.035 
0.070 
-0.075 
0.061 
0.139 
1 
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TABLE 6:  
Interactive Effect of Tax System Changes and Country Risk Factors 
This table presents regression results on firm risk-taking over the 1992 to 2012 period. The variable Firm 
Risk-Taking is defined as the standard deviation over three \ears of a firm¶s ROA¶s deviation from the 
industry-country-specific average ROA. In Panel A (B), we define Country Risk Factor as an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm is located in a country whose country risk proxy in year t is above the yearly 
median of the proxy (in the fourth quartile) and zero otherwise. In column (1), we present results from 
estimates of equation (5) using Political Risk as Country Risk Factor, in column (2) from estimates of 
equation (5) using Fiscal Budget Risk as Country Risk Factor. The main effects specified in equation (5) are 
included in the model but are not reported in this table. We include industry-by-year fixed effects. We report 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and by country-year in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Independent variables are described in Appendix D. 
Panel A: Median Split of Country Risk Factor   
 Dependent Variable: Firm Risk-Taking 
 Political Risk Fiscal Budget Risk 
 (1) (2) 
(I) LCF*CTRStd 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(II) LCF*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Sum of Coefficients (I + II) 0.001 0.002*** 
P > F (I + II = 0) [0.143] [0.002] 
(III) LCB*CTRStd 0.012*** 0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
(IV) LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.011** -0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Sum of Coefficients (III + IV) 0.001 -0.001 
P > F (III + IV = 0) [0.922] [0.729] 
Political Risk -0.005** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Fiscal Budget Risk -0.015*** -0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
LCF 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LCB 0.021*** 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
CTRStd -0.007 -0.017*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) 
CTRStd*Country Risk Factor 0.007 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.000) 
LCF*Country Risk Factor -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LCB*Country Risk Factor -0.029*** 0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Country Risk Factor interactions & Firm- and Country-level controls & 
Industry-by-Year fixed effects included 
Observations 239,772 239,772 
Adjusted R-squared 0.458 0.458 
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TABLE 6:  
Interactive Effect of Tax System Changes and Country Risk Factors (continued) 
Panel B: Indicator Variable Equal to One if Country Risk Factor is in the Fourth Quartile 
 Dependent Variable: Firm Risk-Taking 
 Political Risk Fiscal Budget Risk 
 (1) (2) 
(I) LCF*CTRStd 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(II) LCF*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sum of Coefficients (I + II) 0.001*** 0.002*** 
P > F (I + II = 0)  [0.000] [0.000] 
(III) LCB*CTRStd 0.008*** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
(IV) LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.043*** -0.024*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) 
Sum of Coefficients (III + IV) -0.035*** -0.008** 
P > F (III + IV = 0)  [0.008] [0.024] 
Political Risk -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Fiscal Budget Risk -0.021*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
LCF 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LCB 0.008* 0.011*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
CTRStd -0.002 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.002 -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
LCF*Country Risk Factor -0.001** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
LCB*Country Risk Factor -0.047** 0.010 
 (0.022) (0.007) 
Country Risk Factor interactions & Firm- and Country-level controls &  
Industry-by-Year fixed effects included 
Observations 239,772 239,772 
Adjusted R-squared 0.456 0.457 
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TABLE 7:  
Effectiveness of Loss Offset Provisions in Face of Tax Rate Increases 
This table presents regression results on firm risk-taking over the 1992 to 2012 period. We restrict our sub-
sample to observations three years prior and post to tax rate increases. The variable Firm Risk-Taking is 
defined as the standard deviation over three \ears of a firm¶s ROA¶s deviation from the industr\-country-
specific average ROA. In Panel A (B), we define Country Risk Factor as an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm is located in a country whose country risk proxy in year t is above the yearly median of the proxy 
(in the fourth quartile) and zero otherwise. In column (1), we present results from estimates of equation (5) 
using Political Risk as Country Risk Factor, in column (2) from estimates of equation (5) using Fiscal Budget 
Risk as Country Risk Factor. The main effects specified in equation (5) are included in the model but are not 
reported in this table. We include industry-by-year fixed effects. We report robust standard errors clustered 
by firm and by country-year in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Independent variables are described in Appendix D. 
Panel A: Median Split of Country Risk Factor   
 Dependent Variable: Firm Risk-Taking 
 Political Risk Fiscal Budget Risk 
 (1) (2) 
(I) LCF*CTRStd -0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
(II) LCF*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor 0.003*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Sum of Coefficients (I + II) 0.001*** 0.000 
P > F (I + II = 0) [0.001] [0.9102] 
(III) LCB*CTRStd 0.020*** 0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
(IV) LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.004 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
Sum of Coefficients (III + IV) 0.016*** 0.006 
P > F (III + IV = 0) [0.001] [0.266] 
Country Risk Factor interactions & Firm- and Country-level controls & 
Industry-by-Year fixed effects included 
Observations 23,255 23,255 
Adjusted R-squared 0.412 0.408 
Panel B: Indicator Variable Equal to One if Country Risk Factor is in the Fourth Quartile 
(I) LCF*CTRStd 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(II) LCF*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Sum of Coefficients (I + II) -0.001 0.002* 
P > F (I + II = 0)  [0.342] [0.054] 
(III) LCB*CTRStd 0.015*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
(IV) LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.044*** -0.073*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Sum of Coefficients (III + IV) -0.029** -0.061*** 
P > F (III + IV = 0)  [0.023] [0.006] 
Country Risk Factor interactions & Firm- and Country-level controls &  
Industry-by-Year fixed effects included 
Observations 23,255 23,255 
Adjusted R-squared 0.407 0.412 
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TABLE 8:  
Effect of Country Risk in Countries with Low vs. High Corporate Tax Rates 
This table presents regression results on firm risk-taking over the 1992 to 2012 period. The variable Firm Risk-
Taking is defined as the standard deviation over three \ears of a firm¶s ROA¶s deviation from the industry-country-
specific average ROA. In Panel A, we estimate equation (5) including all observations. In Panel B, we restrict our 
sub-sample to observations three years prior and post to tax rate increases. We define Country Risk Factor as an 
indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in a country whose country risk proxy is above the yearly 
median of the proxy. In columns (1) and (2), we estimate equation (5) using Political Risk, in column (3) and (4) 
using Fiscal Budget Risk as Country Risk Factor. Columns (1) and (3) present results for firms in countries with 
statutory corporate tax rates below the median (33%). Columns (2) and (4) present results for firms in countries 
with statutory corporate tax rates above the median (33%). The main effects specified in equation (5) are included 
in the model but are not reported in this table. We include industry-by-year fixed effects. We report robust standard 
errors clustered by firm and by country-year in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Independent variables are described in Appendix D. 
Panel A: All Observations 
 Dependent Variable: Firm Risk-Taking 
 Political Risk Fiscal Budget Risk 
 Low Tax Rate High Tax Rate Low Tax Rate High Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(I) LCF*CTRStd -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
(II) LCF*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor 0.000 0.002 0.001** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Sum of Coefficients (I + II) 0.000 0.002* 0.001* 0.004*** 
P > F (I + II = 0) [0.401] [0.0757] [0.0946] [0.000] 
(III) LCB*CTRStd 0.017** 0.008 0.026*** -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.015) 
(IV) LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.002 -0.013 -0.022* -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) 
Sum of Coefficients (III + IV) 0.015** -0.005 0.004 -0.009 
P > F (III + IV = 0) [0.021] [0.456] [0.699] [0.198] 
Observations 108,886 130,862 108,886 130,862 
Adjusted R-squared 0.403 0.507 0.404 0.509 
Country Risk Factor interactions & Firm- and Country-level controls & Industry-by-Year fixed effects included 
Panel B: Tax Rate Increases 
 Low Tax Rate High Tax Rate Low Tax Rate High Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(I) LCF*CTRStd 0.001 0.003 0.004** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
(II) LCF*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Sum of Coefficients (I + II) 0.001 0.003* 0.006 0.001 
P > F (I + II = 0) [0.139] [0.067] [0.116] [0.801] 
(III) LCB*CTRStd 0.022*** 0.046*** 0.031 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.019) (0.023) 
(IV) LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.013 -0.095*** -0.018 -0.069 
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.029) (0.051) 
Sum of Coefficients (III + IV) 0.009 -0.049 0.013 -0.069* 
P > F (III + IV = 0) [0.399] [0.146] [0.778] [0.073] 
Observations 14,138 9,057 14,138 9,057 
Adjusted R-squared 0.409 0.475 0.410 0.469 
Country Risk Factor interactions & Firm- and Country-level controls & Industry-by-Year fixed effects included 
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T
A
B
L
E
 9:  
C
ountry-L
evel A
nalysis 
This table presents regression results on firm
 risk-taking over the 1992 to 2012 period. The variable Patent Applications is defined as the logarithm
 of patent applications 
by residents in a country. W
e lag this variable by three years to account for tim
ing differences betw
een R
&
D
 expenditures and patenting. The variable R&
D
 Expenditures 
/ G
D
P is defined as the ratio of a countr\¶s total research and developm
ent expenditure to its G
D
P. In colum
n (1) and (3), w
e present results from
 estim
ates of equation 
(5) using Political Risk as C
ountry Risk Factor, in colum
n (2) and (4) from
 estim
ates of equation (5) using Fiscal Budget Risk as C
ountry Risk Factor. The m
ain effects 
specified in equation (5) are included in the m
odel but are not reported in this table. W
e calculate quartiles of G
D
P grow
th and quartiles of G
D
P in the current and then 
include G
D
P
±G
row
th-Level±Industry±Y
ear fixed effects. W
e report robust standard errors clustered by firm
 and by country-year in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%
, 5%
, and 1%
 level, respectively. Independent variables are described in A
ppendix D
. 
M
edian Split of Country Risk Factor 
 
 
 
 
D
ependent Variable: 
Patent Applications 
R&
D
 Expenditures / G
D
P 
 
Political R
isk 
Fiscal B
udget Risk 
Political R
isk 
Fiscal B
udget Risk 
 
(1) 
(2) 
 
 
(I) LC
F*C
TR
Std 
0.032*** 
0.006 
-0.006 
-0.002 
 
(0.007) 
(0.004) 
(0.005) 
(0.002) 
(II) LC
F*C
TR
Std*C
ountry R
isk Factor 
-0.030*** 
-0.016*** 
0.006 
0.001 
 
(0.009) 
(0.006) 
(0.005) 
(0.004) 
Sum
 of C
oefficients (I +
 II) 
0.002 
-0.010 
0.000 
-0.001 
P > F (I + II = 0) 
0.774 
0.051 
[0.861] 
[0.883] 
(III) LC
B
*C
TR
Std 
0.152* 
0.155*** 
0.196*** 
0.092* 
 
(0.079) 
(0.057) 
(0.063) 
(0.054) 
(IV) LC
B
*C
TR
Std*C
ountry R
isk Factor 
-0.096 
-0.293*** 
-0.338*** 
-0.168*** 
 
(0.085) 
(0.068) 
(0.081) 
(0.061) 
Sum
 of C
oefficients (III +
 IV) 
0.056 
-0.138 
-0.142** 
-0.076 
P > F (III + IV
 = 0) 
0.332 
0.015 
[0.028] 
[0.094]* 
Country Risk Factor interactions &
 C
ountry-level controls &
 G
D
P-G
row
th-Q
uartile-Ln(G
D
P)-Ind-Y
ear fixed effects included 
O
bservations 
784 
784 
677 
677 
A
djusted R
-squared 
0.978 
0.978 
0.971 
0.970 
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TABLE 10:  
Periods of Heightened Fiscal Budget Risk in the United States 
This table presents regression results for difference-in-differences tests around the federal budget crises in 
the U.S. using a sample of U.S. and Canadian firms from 2010 to 2013. In Panel A, we estimate equation 
(6) for the quarter of the budget crisis and two (one) quarter prior to the crisis. US is equal to one if a firm is 
domiciled in the U.S. and 0 otherwise. Post (i.e., Post_DC, Post_FC, and Post_GS) is equal to one for firm-
quarter observations in the quarter in which debt ceiling, fiscal cliff, and government shutdown occurred 
(i.e., 2011 Q2, 2012 Q4, and 2013 Q4, respectively). Post is equal to zero in quarters before the respective 
budget crisis. In Panel B, we estimate equation (6) Post_Placebo equals one for quarters two quarters before 
the actual events and onwards. The variable Firm Risk-Taking is defined as the standard deviation over three 
\ears of a firm¶s ROA¶s deviation from the industr\-country-specific average ROA. We include industry-
by-year fixed effects and report robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Independent variables are described in Appendix 
E. 
Panel A: Events around U.S. Fiscal Budget Crises 
 Dependent Variable: Firm Risk-Taking 
 Two Pre-Quarters One Pre-Quarter 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
US*Post_DC -0.003   -0.004   
 (0.003)   (0.003)   
US*Post_FC  -0.012***   -0.011**  
  (0.004)   (0.005)  
US*Post_GS   -0.012***   -0.013*** 
   (0.004)   (0.004) 
US -0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.007 -0.005 0.007 0.001 -0.009 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
Sales Growth 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.006** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA -0.404*** -0.442*** -0.429*** -0.390*** -0.444*** -0.414*** 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) 
MB -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-by-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,541 10,424 10,689 7,045 6,907 7,059 
Adjusted R-squared 0.480 0.570 0.520 0.470 0.580 0.487 
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TABLE 10:  
Periods of Heightened Fiscal Budget Risk in the United States (continued) 
Panel B: Placebo Events around U.S. Fiscal Budget Crises 
 Dependent Variable: Firm Risk-Taking 
 Two Pre-Quarters One Pre-Quarter 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
US*Post_Placebo_DC -0.002   -0.002   
 (0.005)   (0.005)   
US*Post_Placebo_FC  -0.001   0.008**  
  (0.004)   (0.004)  
US*Post_Placebo_GS   -0.002   0.004 
   (0.003)   (0.003) 
US -0.000 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Size -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.022** 0.006 -0.000 0.022** 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) 
Sales Growth 0.005 0.002 -0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA -0.446*** -0.414*** -0.453*** -0.446*** -0.421*** -0.455*** 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.020) (0.024) 
MB -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-by-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,013 6,987 7,199 7,013 10,425 10,643 
Adjusted R-squared 0.503 0.531 0.596 0.503 0.530 0.582 
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TABLE 11:  
Robustness Tests: – Cross-Country Sample 
This table presents robustness tests for the cross-country sample. Panel A presents regression results on firm 
risk-taking over the 2004 to 2012 period including interactions of country risk and loss offset restrictions 
with loss offset variables and tax rates, respectively. Column (1) presents results from estimates of equation 
(5) using Political Risk as Country Risk Factor. Column (2) presents results from estimates of equation (5) 
using Fiscal Budget Risk as Country Risk Factor. Loss_Offset_Restriction is defined as the adjusted 
percentages of country-specific present value of tax losses that can be offset for a time horizon of 20 years 
(Jacob et al. 2011). The main effects specified in equation (5) are included in the model but are not reported 
in this table. We include industry-by-year fixed effects. We report robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and by country-year in parentheses. Panel B presents regression results on firm risk-taking over the 1992 to 
2012 period. In Columns (1), (3), and (5), we estimate equation (5) using Political Risk. In Columns (2), (4), 
and (6) we estimate equation (5) using Fiscal Budget Risk as Country Risk Factor. The main effects specified 
in equation (5) are included in the model but are not reported in this table. We calculate quartiles of GDP 
growth and quartiles of GDP in the current and then include GDP±Growth-Level±Industry±Year fixed 
effects. In Columns (5) and (6), we additionally include firm fixed effects. We report robust standard errors 
clustered by country-year if not otherwise indicated in parentheses. The variable Firm Risk-Taking is defined 
as the standard deviation over three years of a firm¶s ROA¶s deviation from the industr\-country-specific 
average ROA. We define Country Risk Factor as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in a 
country whose country risk proxy in year t is in the fourth quartile and zero otherwise. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Independent variables are described in Appendix 
D. 
Panel A: Horse Race of Statutory Loss Offset Limitations and Country Risk Factors 
(I) LCB*CTRStd 0.012*** 0.033*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
(II) LCB*CTRStd*Country Risk Factor -0.111* -0.045*** 
 (0.062) (0.007) 
(III) LCB*CTRStd*Loss_Offset_Restriction 0.006 -0.064*** 
 (0.036) (0.014) 
Sum of Coefficients (I + II) -0.099*** -0.012*** 
P > F (I + II = 0)  [0.001] [0.000] 
Sum of Coefficients (I + III) 0.018*** -0.031*** 
P > F (I + III = 0) [0.001] [0.001] 
Country Risk Factor interactions & Firm- and Country-level controls  
& Industry-by-Year fixed effects included 
Observations 165,806 165,806 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460 0.461 
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T
A
B
L
E
 11:  
R
obustness T
ests: – C
ross-C
ountry Sam
ple (continued) 
Panel B: Country-G
roup and Firm
-Level Analyses 
 
D
ependent Variable: Firm
 Risk-Taking 
 
Political 
Fiscal 
Political 
Fiscal 
Political 
Fiscal 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(I) LC
F*C
TR
Std 
-0.001*** 
-0.001*** 
-0.001 
-0.001 
0.001*** 
0.000 
 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
(II) LC
F*C
TR
Std*C
ountry R
isk Factor 
0.002*** 
0.001* 
0.002*** 
0.001* 
-0.002*** 
0.000 
 
(0.000) 
(0.001) 
(0.000) 
(0.001) 
(0.001) 
(0.000) 
Sum
 of C
oefficients (I + II) 
0.001*** 
0.000 
0.001*** 
0.000 
-0.001** 
0.000 
P > F (I + II = 0) 
[0.000] 
[0.315] 
[0.000] 
[0.291] 
[0.022] 
[0.364] 
(III) LC
B
*C
TR
Std 
0.014*** 
0.013*** 
0.014** 
0.013* 
0.004 
0.001 
 
(0.003) 
(0.004) 
(0.006) 
(0.007) 
(0.003) 
(0.003) 
(IV) LC
B*C
TR
Std*C
ountry R
isk Factor 
-0.031** 
-0.006 
-0.031** 
-0.006 
-0.005 
0.001 
 
(0.014) 
(0.007) 
(0.014) 
(0.009) 
(0.011) 
(0.005) 
Sum
 of C
oefficients (III + IV) 
-0.017 
0.007 
-0.017 
0.007 
-0.001 
0.002 
P > F (III + IV
 = 0) 
[0.176] 
[0.234] 
[0.137] 
[0.221] 
[0.903] 
[0.525] 
O
bservations 
238,905 
238,905 
238,905 
238,905 
237,252 
237,252 
A
djusted R
-squared 
0.494 
0.494 
0.494 
0.494 
0.614 
0.614 
C
ontrols 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Firm
 FE 
N
o 
N
o 
N
o 
N
o 
Y
es 
Y
es 
G
D
P-G
row
th-Q
uartile-Ln(G
D
P)-Ind-Y
ear FE 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
N
o 
N
o 
C
luster 
C
ountry-Y
ear 
C
ountry-Y
ear 
C
ountry 
C
ountry 
C
ountry-Y
ear 
C
ountry-Y
ear 
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TABLE A.1:  
Effect of Tax Rates and Loss Offset Rules on Corporate Risk-Taking 
This table validates the results documented by Langenmayr and Lester (2018) using a larger sample that 
includes more heterogeneous countries over the 1992 to 2012 period. We use the following regression 
specification: 
Firm Risk-Taking i,t = Į0 + ȕ1 LCj,t + ȕ2 CTRStdj,t + ȕ3  LC*CTRStdj,t + ȕn Ci,j,t +Įk,t + İi,j,t    (12) 
The variable Firm Risk-Taking is defined as the standard deviation over three \ears of a firm¶s ROA¶s 
deviation from the industry-country-specific average ROA. In columns (1) and (2), we estimate equation 
(12) without the interactions of loss offset rules and standardized corporate tax rates using the full sample. 
In columns 3 (4), we estimate equation (12) using the full sample without (with) Inflation and country 
risk controls. In column (5), we estimate equation (12) for domestic firms (Domestic = 1), i.e. firms that 
have more than 10% of their business operations not in the country in which they are headquartered. All 
specifications include industry-by-year fixed effects. We report robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and by country-year in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. Independent variables are described in Appendix D. 
 Dependent Variable: Firm Risk-Taking 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LCF 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LCB 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.010***  
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CTRStd 0.003 -0.001 -0.016*** -0.004 -0.003  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
LCF*CTRStd   0.001*** 0.001** 0.001* 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LCB*CTRStd   0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Size  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage  0.047*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.051***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Sales Growth  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA  -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.310*** -0.305***  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
MB  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Growth  0.035** 0.022 0.015 0.009 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Inflation    -0.009*** -0.006*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Political Risk    -0.011*** -0.011*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Fiscal Budget Risk    0.002 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 239,772 239,772 239,772 239,772 184,570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114 0.453 0.455 0.456 0.475 
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